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The  Swedish  economic  policy  to  combine  full  employment  and  equity  with price 
stability and economic growth was developed by two trade union economists shortly 
after World War II. Through the use of extensive employment policy measures, a tight 
fiscal policy and a wage policy of solidarity, the Rehn-Meidner model represents a 
unique third way between Keynesianism and monetarism. This essay analyses the 
application and performance of the Rehn-Meidner model in Sweden. Although never 
consistently applied, it is possible to distinguish a golden age for the model from the 
late 1950s to the early 1970s. In the 1970s and the 1980s, governments abandoned the 
restrictive macroeconomic means of the model and were thus unable to combine low 
rates of unemployment with low inflation and high economic growth. Since the early 
1990s, Sweden has not met the requirement of full employment in the Rehn-Meidner 
model. Recent declarations by the EU to prioritise full employment once again but 
without giving up the objectives of price stability and growth legitimise a renewed 
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In the early post-war period, two Swedish trade-union economists presented a unique 
economic  and  wage  policy  program,  the  so-called  Rehn-Meidner  model,  aimed  at 
combining full employment and fair wages with low inflation and high economic 
growth. In a report to the 1951 Congress of the LO (The Swedish Confederation of 
Trade Unions, the Swedish TUC), Gösta Rehn and Rudolf Meidner recommended a 
restrained general economic policy - principally indirect taxation - in combination 
with a wage policy of solidarity and an active labour market policy (Meidner and 
Rehn  et  al.,  1953).  Meidner  was  then  the  head  of  the  LO  Economics  Research 
Department and Rehn the department’s most prominent economist. In the LO report 
Rehn and Meidner focused on appropriate means to achieve full employment, price 
stability  and  wage  equality,  not  on  collective  saving  and  economic  growth.  Other 




Rehn and Meidner were not the inventors of an active labour market policy or a wage 
policy of solidarity. But it was easier for representatives of government and trade 
unions to support and win acceptance for mobility-stimulating labour market policy 
and a wage policy of solidarity if there were good arguments for the policies leading 
to lower inflation and higher real wages. Both adherents and critics of Swedish labour 
market and wage policies have overlooked the comprehensive and coherent nature of 
the Rehn-Meidner model. The model was intended to satisfy all four objectives of 
post-war economic policy. Further, each policy measure had more than one purpose 
and also the aim of making other means more effective. The interaction between the 
means makes it difficult to lift out parts of the Rehn-Meidner model and keep the rest.  
 
The prime aim of this paper is to analyse the application and functioning of the Rehn-
Meidner  policy  model  in  Sweden.  It  also  addresses  the  question  of  whether  the 
                                           






economic  development  in  Sweden  in  the  post-war  period  supports  the  model’s 
underpinning economic theory.  
 
Analysing  the  application  of  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  in  Sweden  is  not  without 
complications. An economic policy and wage policy in conformity with the model 
does not necessarily mean that the model itself has been guiding decision makers. 
Swedish politicians might have been influenced by economic-policy models, in some 
respects similar to the Rehn-Meidner model. Neither do politicians’ references to the 
model ex post prove that it really had any influence over the economic policy during 
the  period  under  review.  Another  problem  when  analysing  the  application  of  the 
Rehn-Meidner model, is that its fathers do not provide an unambiguous blueprint of 
the design of general economic policy (fiscal and monetary policy) in a recession. The 
model was basically  formulated for  an overheated economy.  However,  difficulties 
defining  the  Rehn-Meidner  program  for  a  recession  have  not  stopped  me  from 
drawing some conclusions about its applicability during the post-war period.  
 
To start, I will provide a brief account of the Rehn-Meidner policy program and also 
of its underlying economic theory (Section 2). I will then outline the application and 
performance of the Rehn-Meidner model in Sweden through a summary description 
of Keynesian economic policy during the early post-war years (Section 3). The Rehn-
Meidner model was then never fully and consciously applied, but it is possible to 
speak of a golden age for the model, and also for Sweden, from the end of the 1950s 
up to the first oil crisis in 1973-1974 (Section 4). The golden age was followed by a 
period, up to the deep Swedish economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s, with 
major external challenges to, and some obvious departures from the model (Section 
5).  The  1990s
  meant  a  new  institutional  and  theoretical  framework  for  economic 
policy, and also a deviation from full employment, in Sweden (Section 6). Although 
the  future  of  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  in  Sweden  is  uncertain  in  the  light  of 









2. The content of the Rehn-Meidner model 
 
2.1 An integrated policy of macroeconomic stability, growth and equity 
 
The original Rehn-Meidner model advocates a tight fiscal policy in an overheated 
economy, and also in the medium term, to control inflation. This policy was defined 
for an economy of fixed exchange rates. In the 1960s and 1970s, Rehn suggested 
revaluation as  another deflationary means in the fight against inflation (see Rehn, 
1977, p. 223). A restrictive fiscal policy, or a revaluation, should keep down nominal 
wage increases under peak conditions by its negative impact on prices, and thus on the 
amount  of  marginal  (expected)  profits  from  recruiting  labour  (see  the  marginal 
productivity theory).
2 Fiscal restraint was also intended to put downward pressure on 
prices in the medium term in a situation where nominal wage growth was maintained 
by a selective policy of full employment (see below). In addition Rehn and Meidner 
expected that restrictive fiscal policy would have some wage-restraining effects, both 
in the medium term and under peak conditions, by its contribution to a decline of 
actual profit margins. They assumed that high gross profit margins would boost firms’ 
financial capacity to bid up wages for scarce labour. Rehn and Meidner also thought 
that high profit margins would increase firms’ willingness (and ability) to remunerate 
employees more generously than their performance merits (X-inefficiency wages).
3  
 
In the Rehn-Meidner model, high marginal profits from recruiting labour and high 
actual profit margins, lead to widespread wage drift, i.e. to wage increases outside 
central  agreements,  in  wage  leading  sectors.
4  (In  Sweden  the  exposed  sector  has 
                                           
2 Rehn and Meidner played down the possibility that the deflationary effects of fiscal restraint would be 
offset by increases in national competitiveness through domestic price reductions. 
 
3  Rehn  and  Meidner  maintained  further,  as  today’s  efficiency-wage  theorists,  that  higher  profits 
accruing to firms’ owners would provoke higher wage claims. However, Rehn and Meidner did not 
refer, as the efficiency-wage theorists, to the risk of adverse productivity effects if employers were to 
reject these demands for higher wages on equity grounds (see, however, Hansen and Rehn, 1956, p. 90 
and Rehn, 1987, p. 76). It seems that Rehn and Meidner eventually fell back on the argument that high 
actual profit margins would intensify firms’ wage competition for scarce labour or their propensity (and 
ability) to pay X-inefficient wages (Rehn, 1952a, pp. 32-43, 1969, pp. 163 and 170, and 1987, pp. 65-8; 
Meidner and Rehn et al., 1953, pp. 92-3; Hansen and Rehn, 1956, p. 89; Erixon, 2000, pp. 25-9 and 
2001, pp. 23-4). 
 
4 The notion of profit margins in Rehn and Meidner’s works includes markups (over marginal costs) on 
imperfect  product  markets,  intra-marginal  profits  on  competitive  markets  in  which  product  supply 




generally been wage leading in the postwar period.) It is employers who take iniatives 
to increase nominal wages while wage earners care about relative-wage positions. As 
a consequence, wage drift will subsequently result in compensatory demands from 
employee  groups,  who  experience  moderate  wage  drift,  to  reclaim  earlier  income 
relations.  
 
Rehn and Meidner recommended a restrictive fiscal policy in the medium term not 
only to reduce inflation – this policy should also, by contributing to a decline in profit 
margins, alter functional income distribution in favour of labour and increase public 
saving at the expense of company saving. They preferred public saving for reasons of 
income and wealth distribution and industrial policy (Rehn, 1952a, pp. 36 and 51, 
1952b, p. 74 and 1969, p. 165). These objectives make public saving the least market-
conforming component of the Rehn-Meidner model. 
 
The  term  “selective  employment  policy”  is  often  used  to  distinguish  the  Rehn-
Meidner model from a Keynesian strategy of full employment based on expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policy. In this paper, the term will comprise active labour market 
policies  but  also  marginal  employment  subsidies,  which  Rehn  anxiously  came  to 
argue  in  favour  of  from  the  1970s.  Rehn  hoped  that  subsidies  to  firms  that  are 
recruiting labour or undertaking investment would reduce both unemployment and 
inflation  by  creating  incentives  to  reduce  prices.  He  also  expected  that  marginal 
subsidies would lead to downward pressure on prices by the pertinent decline in profit 
margins for firms that do not qualify for the subsidies (Rehn, 1982; Erixon, 2000, pp. 
27-9). In Rehn’s final proposal the subsidies should be permanent and offered to firms 
in all regions and sectors and for all kinds of labour (Rehn, 1987, pp. 71-2 and 1993, 
pp. 21-2). 
 
Labour market policies are the main instruments in the original Rehn-Meidner model 
to  prevent  tendencies  of  increased  open  unemployment  under  a  restrictive  fiscal 
policy when nominal wages are more rigid than prices. What more is, labour-market 
policy measures to guarantee full employment at a high level of ambition explain why 
                                                                                                                         
product markets in which firms have different productivity levels (the vintage approach). It is difficult 
however to associate perfect product markets in the long run with productivity differentials between 




nominal  wages  are  rigid  downwards  in  the  Rehn-Meidner  model,  at  least  in  a 
recession and in the medium term. Rehn and Meidner assumed that an active labour 
market policy brings higher nominal wage increases than would occur in a regime of 
open unemployment as trade unions and individual workers gain strength in a full 
employment situation.
5 The propensity of labour market policy to reduce inflation by 
making labour markets more effective (and wage earners more productive) is offset 
by  the  policy’s  tendency  to  keep  up  wages.  In  the  Rehn-Meidner  model,  labour 
market  policies  become  a  weapon  in  the  fight  against  inflation  through  their 
contribution to a profit-margin squeeze.  
 
Active  labour  market  policies  have  three  elements,  supply-oriented  measures 
(retraining,  vocational  education  and  relocation  grants),  actions  to  improve  the 
matching process on the labour market and targeted demand policy, i.e. government 
measures to increase demand for labour in certain regions, industries and firms. Rehn 
and Meidner did not confront the demand component of labour market policy with the 
supply and adjustment oriented measures. Formulations e.g. in the 1951 LO report, 
however, point to Rehn and Meidner putting greater emphasis on mobility-enhancing 
policies (including retraining) than on job-creation measures (Meidner and Rehn et 
al., 1953, pp. 92-3). The purpose of labour market policy was, after all, not only to 
maintain full employment and combat inflation by contributing to a decline in actual 
profit margins. The policy was also intended to counteract inflationary bottlenecks in 
the labour market and support structural change in general.  
 
A  further  task  of  mobility-enhancing  labour  market  policies  in  the  Rehn-Meidner 
model is to back up the solidarity wage policy in its endeavours to build a fair wage 
structure and  rapid structural change. A wage  policy of solidarity - which can be 
achieved through coordinated wage negotiations only - implies that employees with 
                                                                                                                         
 
5 Rehn (1952a, p. 32, (1977, p. 212) and (1982, p. 44); Meidner and Rehn et al. (1953, pp. 46-9 and 
99); Rehn (1987, p. 67), see also Erixon (2000, pp. 38-40 and 67). The argument that labour market 
policy should strengthen the bargaining position of labour is critical e.g. in the case of Sweden where 
economic compensation at retraining schemes is equal to unemployment compensation for trade union 
members. By their strong emphasis on market forces in wage formation (see wage drift) Rehn and 
Meidner could have argued instead that labour market policy keeps up wage growth by maintaining 
labour  scarcity  per  se.  Labour  market  training  and  relief  work  in  particular  may  alleviate  wage 
competition by reducing the number of job applicants and the intensity of job search. These phenomena 




identical jobs should be offered the same wages irrespective of the profits of firms and 
industries.  Wage  differences  should  reflect  “objective”  differences  in  working 
environment and job content, e.g. differences in accident and unemployment risks, 
physical strain and skill demands.  In fact, solidarity wage policy is an instrument 
anticipating a long-run equilibrium in perfect labour markets (Rehn, 1969, p. 165). 
But  for  the  attainment  of  fair  wages,  labour  mobility-enhancing  and  deflationary-
policy  measures  must  be  introduced  to  avoid  significant  wage  differentials  when 
dynamic firms try to recruit labour.  
 
According to the Rehn-Meidner model, the wage policy of solidarity is compatible 
with economic growth.  Equal remuneration for  identical jobs will establish a cost 
pressure on low-productivity firms, which must rationalise or die.
6 The closure of 
inefficient firms enhances average productivity per se, but also indirectly by freeing 
resources for the expansion of dynamic firms. Further, a wage policy of solidarity 
would  strengthen  incentives  for  structural  change  by  leading  to  larger  profit 
differentials between industries and between firms.  
 
The role of solidarity wage policy in the Rehn-Meidner model is not only to combine 
equity with structural change, but also to participate in the struggle against inflation. 
This wage policy is supposed to hold back wage increases in profitable companies 
willing and able to pay higher wages than the ones of solidarity. Rehn and Meidner 
also thought that the establishment of a “rational” (fair) wage structure would mitigate 
inflationary wage-wage spirals, which tend to appear when unions try to increase or 
maintain the relative wage levels of their members. The wage policy of solidarity is a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for wage stability. The policy leads neither 
to wage stability nor to structural change, if there is no restrictive fiscal policy and 
active labour market policy to  reduce overall profits and promote labour mobility 
(Meidner and Rehn et al., 1953, pp. 90-1 and 96; Rehn, 1952a, pp. 39-44 and 1977, p. 
216).  
 
                                           
6 In the 1951 LO report the notion of rationalization is broad, including the elimination of production 
slacks (the definition in this paper), organizational changes, labour substitution and even the adoption 




The Rehn-Meidner program is an alternative to a “free” market model of structural 
change  in  which  labour  mobility  is  induced  by  wage  differentials  between  firms, 
occupations  and  regions.  Rehn  and  Meidner  thought  that  large  wage  differentials, 
which  are  required  to  overcome  inertia  on  labour  markets,  are  unfair  and  also 
inflationary.  Widening  wage  gaps  can  seldom  be  achieved  through  absolute 
reductions  of  nominal  wages  and  they  will  further  call  forth  compensatory  wage 
claims aimed at reinstating the initial wage structure (Rehn, 1952a, pp. 44-5, 1969, p. 
165 and 1987, pp. 69 and 73-7; Meidner and Rehn et al., 1953, pp. 95-6).  
 
As already mentioned, the Rehn-Meidner view of economic policy in a recession is 
ambiguous.  A  restrictive  fiscal  policy  over  the  business  cycle  does  not  exclude  a 
countercyclical fiscal policy or even an underbalanced public budget in a period of 
low economic activity. The LO report contains no reservations when recommending a 
countercyclical fiscal policy - an underbalanced public budget may be necessary to 
keep full employment (Meidner and Rehn et al., 1953, p. 91). Rehn also claims in 
other works that the price stabilising effects of an overbalanced budget in the medium 
term would indeed increase the scope for public budget deficits. But it seems that 
Rehn only recommended a fiscal policy leading to public budget deficits provided that 
the recession is deep (see Rehn, 1952a, p. 52, 1952b, p. 76, 1969, pp. 166 and 180, 
1977, p. 213 and 1982, pp. 1-3, 8, 18 and 26). A reasonable interpretation of the 
Rehn-Meidner model is that it suggests a selective employment policy together with a 
countercyclical  fiscal  policy  including  the  possibility  of  intentional  public  budget 
deficits during a deep recession (depression). During a “normal” (or weak) recession 
the model thus recommends selective employment stimuli within the framework of a 
fiscal policy that is neutral or restrictive.  
 
Neither is monetary policy unambiguous in the Rehn-Meidner model. In the debate 
between him and Erik Lundberg in the early post-war period, Rehn had criticized the 
use  of  monetary  measures  in  stabilisation  policies.  He  considered  the  policy  of 
permanently low rates of interest in Sweden at the time the most suitable monetary 
policy (Rehn, 1952a, pp. 51-2 and 1952b, pp. 75-6). But already in the 1951 LO 
report Rehn placed a restrictive monetary policy almost on an equal footing with a 
contractionary fiscal policy (Meidner and Rehn et al. 1953, pp. 84 and 90-1, see also 




therefore, that monetary policy should be countercyclical, though restrained in the 
medium term, and directly expansionary in a severe recession only. The difficulty of 
analysing the application of the model’s monetary and fiscal policy lies, of course, in 
deciding whether a recession has been severe or not.  
 
2.2 The Rehn-Meidner model in macroeconomics 
 
The  Stockholm  school  economist  Erik  Lundberg  was  the  academic  economist 
devoting the greatest amount of attention to the Rehn-Meidner model. Lundberg’s 
attitude was sympathetic but critical. His main criticism was political and ideological 
– major public savings and a selective economic policy programs would cause the 
emergence of a bureaucratic control apparatus that in the long term presented a threat 
to democracy. In economic terms Lundberg’s main objection to the model was that it 
underestimated the importance of high profits, both ex ante and ex post, for private 
investment. Admitting the risk of financial “locking-in” effects from self-financing, 
Lundberg  advocated  deregulation  and  capital  tax  reductions  to  improve  the 
functioning of the capital market.
7  
 
However,  Erik  Lundberg  referred  to  the  “Rehn-Salter  model”  to  indicate  that  the 
Rehn-Meidner model was a forerunner of the vintage theory in growth economics 
(Lundberg, 1972, pp. 470-4 and 1985, pp. 17-8). Lundberg shed light on the inevitable 
consequence  of  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  that  price  reductions  as  the  result  of 
restrictive economic policy would stimulate productivity through squeezing average 
profit margins. If wages for identical work are uniform (the wage policy of solidarity), 
low-productivity  firms  would  then  need  to  rationalise  or  perish,  in  which  case 
resources  for  structural  change  would  be  liberated.  Rehn  added  in  the  1960s  that 
productivity  is  also  stimulated  by  low  profits  in  a  recession  –  procyclical  profit 
                                           
7 See Lundberg (1952b, p. 67), (1972, pp. 480-5) and (1985, p. 19). Rehn and Meidner’s reply to 
Lundberg  was  that  economic  policy  must  reduce  profit  margins  in  the  medium  term  but  not  to 
depression levels. Profit margins must also be kept stable in the long run, e.g. through “voluntary” 
incomes policy. Further, Rehn and Meidner emphasised the salience of large profit differentials rather 
than  of  high  profit  levels  in  general  for  economic  growth.  Labour  market  policies,  marginal 
employment  subsidies  and  solidaristic  wage  policy  are  means  to  promote  structural  change  by 
widening profit gaps between dynamic and stagnating firms (and industries), see Meidner and Rehn et 
al. (1953, pp. 90-4), Meidner (1969, p. 193), Rehn (1969, p. 157), (1977, p. 214), (1982, p. 44) and 
(1987, p. 67). 




margins contribute to a countercyclical productivity pattern (see Rehn 1969, pp. 151-2 
and  157  and  below  for  additional  Rehn-Meidner  arguments  for  countercyclical 
productivity development).  
 
The Rehn-Meidner assumption that nominal wages are more rigid than prices on the 
aggregate level, both in the short and medium term, is crucial for the above argument. 
Labour market policy sustaining full employment prevents nominal wages (or rather 
nominal wage growth) from being fully adjusted to a downward shift in aggregate 
demand. (Rehn and Meidner also referred to the existence of adjustment rigidities on 
labour markets in the short run.) Significant price reductions may still occur if product 
markets are highly competitive, or if price-leading, high-productivity firms reduce 
their prices as a response to possible increases in (marginal) labour productivity. Rehn 
also  suggested  that  low  aggregate  demand  might  force  companies  to  reduce  their 
markups.  (The  price  elasticity  of  demand  is  a  negative  function  of  output.) 
Rationalisation might thus be stimulated by low aggregate demand in all firms during 
a recession, not only in low-productivity firms that are threatened by closures. Rehn 
further  assumed,  as  did  Harvey  Leibenstein  in  his  theory  of  X-inefficiencies,  that 
firms experiencing a profit-margin decline not only would reduce their production 
slacks  (rationalise),  but  also  invest  in  new  technologies  (Rehn  1969,  p.  151; 
Leibenstein, 1980, pp. 39, 46 and 234-6).  
 
Rehn’s idea of countercyclical productivity and of productivity stimulation through 
restrictive  macroeconomic  policies,  seems  quite  modern  in  the  light  of  the  “new” 
growth theory (cf. Aghion and Howitt, 1998, Ch.8).
8 Yet the Rehn-Meidner model is 
basically a third way between monetarism and Keynesianism in stabilisation policies. 
The model was first an alternative to a Keynesian economic policy practised e.g. in 
Sweden during the early post-war years. The Keynesian post-war model is here seen 
as a countercyclical general economic policy with a tendency to expansionism, while 
the Rehn-Meidner model implies a countercyclical general economic policy with a 
tendency to deflation. The difference between the Keynesian post-war model and the 
                                           
8 Rehn came to emphasize a “Keynesian” growth theory when unemployment increased in the OECD 
area during the 1970s and 1980s - stimuli of total demand would have increased productivity due to 
increasing returns to scale (Rehn, 1982, pp. 1-5 and 1986, pp. 84-5). During his last years, however, 
Rehn returned to his productivity theory from the 1960s - high profits will reduce efforts by firm agents 




Rehn-Meidner model can be defined more precisely in terms of the Phillips curve. 
The  post-war  Keynesian  solution  to  the  unemployment-inflation  dilemma  is 
connected in this paper with expansionary general economic policies, primarily fiscal 
policies or devaluations, in combination with regulation and selective contractionary 
fiscal measures to conquer inflation. It is mainly incomes policy that will result in a 
downward shift of the Phillips curve in the Keynesian model. In the Rehn-Meidner 
model, by  contrast,  a favourable trade-off between inflation and unemployment is 
obtained  through  a  combination  of  restrictive  fiscal  policies  (or  revaluations)  and 
active labour-market policy measures.  In this model, it is basically a  reduction of 
actual profit margins that leads to a downward shift of the Phillips curve (Rehn, 1969, 
p.  170).  Labour  market  policy’s  propensity  to  reduce  inflation  by  making  labour 
markets more flexible is less important here, as the policy also has a tendency to keep 
up wage claims by reducing open unemployment. 
 
Rehn  and  Meidner  were  of  the  opinion  that  their  policy,  aimed  at  restraining 
aggregate  demand,  squeezing  profit  margins  and  making  labour  markets  more 
effective, is superior to a Keynesian strategy for fighting inflation in an economy 
approaching full employment. They thought that incomes policy is a blunt instrument 
in the fight against inflation if full employment is maintained by expansionary general 
economic-policy  means.  In  this  situation,  declarations  of  wage  restraint  cannot 
prevent  wage  drift  or  high  compensatory  central  wage  increases  for  wage-earner 
groups not covered by coordinated wage agreements. It is tempting for central trade 
unions to strive for wage-drift compensation when their bargaining position has been 
strengthened  by  low  rates  of  unemployment.  Further,  the  Keynesian  remedy  for 
inflation  is  not  only  ineffective,  but  also  counterproductive.  Price  and  investment 
controls  hurt  mainly  efficient  firms  and  investment  projects.  In  addition,  incomes 
policy weakens the willingness of firms to rationalise, if it is at all possible for the 
trade  union  movement  -  which  Rehn  and  Meidner  doubted  -  to  moderate  wage 
demands  in  an  overheated  economy.  Besides,  Rehn  and  Meidner  feared  that 
participation  in  incomes-policy  agreements  would  weaken  the  legitimacy  of  trade 
unions in the eyes of their members (Meidner and Rehn et al., 1953, pp. 81-7, see also 
Rehn, 1952a, pp. 36 and 48-9 and 1987, pp. 62 and 67-8 and Meidner, 1952, pp. 21 





As in other Western countries, support for the Keynesian post-war model gradually 
waned in Sweden during the 1980s and 1990s. Today it is more relevant to compare 
the  Rehn-Meidner  model  with  rational  expectation  theories  and  other  theories 
emphasising the limitations of demand management and regulation to maintain peak 
levels of employment, at least without accelerating inflation. Being a third way in 
economic  policy,  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  shares  some  ideas  with  “new 
monetarism”.
9 The founders of the model envisaged the difficulties of Keynesian fine-
tuning, and they doubted, although with few references to expectations, that peak rates 
of employment could be preserved by a strict Keynesian strategy. Labour scarcity will 
result  in  high  nominal  wage  increases  under  inelastic  labour-supply  conditions. 
Besides, “overfull” employment has adverse effects on productivity by leading to high 
absenteeism and excessive labour turnover (Meidner and Rehn et al., 1953, pp. 37-47 
and 81-2; Rehn, 1952a, pp. 72-3; Hansen and Rehn, 1956, p. 98). The notions of 
NAIRU and a “natural” (equilibrium) rate of unemployment are not awkward from 
the viewpoint of the Rehn-Meidner model (see Rehn, 1982, pp. 11 and 17 and 1987, 
p.  65).  The  model’s  recommendation  of  supply  and  adjustment  measures  on  both 
labour and product markets could be interpreted as attempts to reduce NAIRU and 
increase  GDP  in  the  medium  and  long  term.  Rehn  and  Meidner  here  referred  to 
marginal  employment  subsidies,  labour  market  policies,  and  also  to  the  need  of 
measures to intensify price competition in individual product markets (Rehn, 1952a, 
p. 47 and 1953, p. 281). 
 
However, there are significant differences between a modern monetarist and a Rehn-
Meidner  viewpoint.  The  Rehn-Meidner  model  resists  the  one-sided  emphasis  by 
monetarists on price stability, and their doubts about the efficiency of fiscal measures 
in  stabilisation  policy.  Rehn  and  Meidner  made  no  contribution  to  business-cycle 
theory, but had a weaker faith than most monetarists in the self-curative capacity of 
the laissez-faire economy. They believed that demand management has sustainable 
                                           
9 Of course, all contributions to new macroeconomics, or even to neo-classical macroeconomics, do not 
satisfy  the  basic  principles  of  monetarism  (see  e.g.  the  new-Keynesian  theory  of  wage  and  price 
stickiness in the first case). But the hegemony of the post-war Keynesian model has certainly been 
broken  in  macroeconomics.  Modern  textbooks  emphasise  the  limitations  of  stabilisation  policy  by 
reference  to  the  Ricardian  equivalence,  the  difficulties  of  fine-tuning  and  the  adjustment  of  price 
expectations in the medium or long term. Besides, incomes policy is here seldom seen as a complement 
to  an  expansionary  fiscal  policy  for  maintaining  peak  levels  of  output  and  employment  without 





effects  on  production  and  employment,  and  hence  that  a  persistent  Phillips-curve 
relation exists, except under overheated conditions (cf. Akerlof et al., 2000). Rehn and 
Meidner  could  have  claimed  here,  like  Keynes  in  the  General  Theory,  that  wage 
earners governed by relative-wage preferences will accept price increases leading to a 
general reduction of real wages.
10 Furthermore, the Rehn-Meidner model excludes 
deregulation of labour markets which weaken the negotiating position of labour. Also, 
by participating in coordinated wage bargaining, central labour-market organisations 
are strategic agents for solidarity wage policy. 
 
The  Anglo-American  monetarist  literature  does  not  contain  a  Rehn-Meidner 
hypothesis that productivity is stimulated directly by low profit margins. Rehn and 
Meidner suggested that fiscal restraints and labour market policies together have a 
positive impact on productivity in the medium term - a profit-squeezing economic 
policy  would  promote  structural  change,  rationalisation  and  investment  in  new 
technologies. There are also very few references in the new macroeconomic literature 
to the Rehn-Meidner conjecture that lower markups and intra-marginal profits will 
reduce nominal wage growth by weakening the propensity (and ability) to offer X-
inefficient  wages  or  worsening  the  financial  opportunities  for  wage  bidding.  In 
modern  macroeconomics,  lower  markups  will  chiefly  stimulate  nominal  wages 
(through their positive effects on labour demand) or leave them intact.  
 
The main difference between the Swedish third way and a monetarist view is that 
Rehn and Meidner, despite all, believed in state interventionism to achieve very low 
rates of unemployment, at least below 3 per cent, without accelerating inflation.
11 
Neo-monetarists have profound doubts about the efficiency, not only of regulation, 
but also of selective employment programs. In fact, a basic assumption in the Rehn-
Meidner model itself is that labour market programs will increase the pace of nominal 
                                           
10 As Rehn and Meidner focused on an overheated economy and on an economy  with continuous 
productivity  increases, they  were  not directly concerned with the case of absolute  wage stickiness 
(Erixon, 2000, pp. 37-8).  
 
11 The Rehn-Meidner model is also a “third way” by its hypothesis that inflationary wage-wage spirals 
are mitigated by fair wages. The monetarist view provides no room for income distribution in the 
analysis  of  stabilization  policy.  Income  distribution  matters  for  macroeconomic  stability  in  post-
Keynesian models - aggregate demand is stimulated by a decline in profits share of GDP since wage 
earners have a lower saving propensity than capital owners. This theory has no correspondance in the 




wage  increases.  The  tendency  to  higher  nominal  wages  through  an  active  labour 
market policy is mitigated, but not offset, in the model by the policy’s contribution to 
a profit margin squeeze and a more flexible labour market. To meet a neo-monetarist 
criticism that the Rehn-Meidner model is inflationary, an adherent of the model must 
emphasise the positive productivity effects of a profit-margin decline. Any remaining 
differences between a Rehn-Meidnerian and neo-monetarist view on the possibilities 
of maintaining unemployment rates below 3 percent by policy interventions probably 
reflects more basic differences in their evaluation of the risk of misuses of political 
power. 
 
There are also differences between the Rehn-Meidner wage theory and modern labour 
market theories in which real wages and employment are determined by price and 
wage setting functions. Solidarity wage policy and labour market policy in itself could 
easily be analysed within the new theoretical framework. But market forces have a 
stronger influence on (nominal) wages at the aggregate level in the Rehn-Meidner 
model  than  in  modern  trade  union  and  bargaining  theories,  both  directly  and,  by 
triggering  wage  drift,  as  a  guideline  for  central  wage  negotiations  (see  the  more 
detailed theoretical comparison in Erixon, 2000, pp. 46-56 and 53-65 and 2004, pp. 
90-3).  In  addition,  modern  bargaining  and  trade  union  theories  have  not  yet 
considered the Rehn-Meidner hypothesis that high profits promote X-inefficient wage 
increases. Further, the assumption that wage earners care, not for real wages, but for 
relative  wages,  e.g.  by  comparisons  with  people  in  dissimilar  occupations,  is 
fundamental in the Rehn-Meidner model but not always in wage-setting models.  
 
This  chapter  has  hopefully  contributed  to  putting  an  end  to  some  misconceptions 
about the “Swedish model” in the international literature. The Rehn-Meidner model is 
not, at least in theory, a social innovation of wage restraint. First, as wage earners are 
assumed to gain strength in a state of full employment, active labour market policy is 
not an instrument to reduce inflation in itself. It is by contributing to a fall in profit 
margins that the policy becomes a vehicle in the fight against inflation. The profit fall 
is supposed to mitigate the tendency to high nominal wage growth at low rates of 
unemployment, and further to stimulate the rate of productivity increases. Second, in 
                                                                                                                         




the  Rehn-Meidner  model,  coordinated  negotiations  are  means  to  achieving  wage 
moderation only through their impact on the wage structure. In addition, according to 
the model, wage restraint cannot be achieved by coordinated wage agreements alone – 
it would depend on the support of a contractionary macroeconomic policy, a selective 
employment policy, and a wage policy of solidarity. 
 
 
3. Swedish economic policy before the Rehn-Meidner model 
 
Already at the beginning of the 1930s, a Social Democrat government had accepted, 
and partially  also practised, the idea of public  budget deficits in a recession. The 
Stockholm school, with Gunnar Myrdal and Bertil Ohlin as prominent spokesmen, 
contributed to the early breakthrough of “Keynesian” ideas in Sweden. The theories of 
Keynes  and  the  Stockholm  school  provided  arguments  for  an  expansionary  fiscal 
policy during mass unemployment, and a countercyclical economic policy in general, 
respectively.  These  theories  had  a  strong  influence  on  Swedish  economic  policy 
immediately  after  the  Second  World  War.  Myrdal  served  as  an  expert  in  the 
committee  charged  with  the  task  of  writing  the  post-war  program  of  the  labour 
movement  (Arbetarrörelsens  efterkrigsprogram,  1944).  The  LO  economist  Gösta 
Rehn was a coordinator of the committee, and consequently one of the authors of the 
program.  The  post-war  program  was  a  radical  child  of  the  Keynesian  revolution, 
showing strong similarities to the “Beveridge plan” (Beveridge, 1944). Both programs 
recommended  investment  planning  and  regulation  of  capital  and  product  markets 
(including some nationalisation) to maintain peak levels of employment.  
 
The post-war program of the Swedish labour movement was built upon expectations 
of a coming depression similar to the one a few years after the First World War. But 
the expected post-war depression did not occur. The rapid reconstruction of Western 
Europe was very favourable to Swedish export industries, which specialized in raw 
materials, semi-finished goods, and investment goods. An export boom, coupled with 
high domestic investments and a pent-up demand for housing and durable consumer 
goods, led to overheating tendencies in the Swedish economy during the second half 
of the 1940s and the early 1950s. Neither Social Democrat governments, nor the non-




an  overheated  market  economy  with  its  inherent  tendency  to  a  low  rate  of 
unemployment. Stabilisation policy in Sweden from the end of World War II to the 
mid-1950s showed similarities to the post-war program of the labour movement and 
the Beveridge plan. Both programs intended to fight inflation with the help of price 
controls, incomes policy and other regulations - not through a strict economic policy 
endangering  full  employment  (Beveridge,  1944,  pp.  198-207;  Arbetarrörelsens 
efterkrigsprogram,  1944,  pp.  48-9).  Social  Democrat  goverments  did  not  use 
restrictive general economic policy to counteract the tendencies towards overheating 
during the second half of the 1940s and first half of the 1950s.
12 Fiscal policy (by 
general government) was countercyclical but mainly expansionary (cf. Matthiesen, 
1971, pp. 176-7). In fact, in 1947, with the support of the LO leadership, a Social 
Democrat  government  had  abolished  general  sales  taxes  in  stabilisation  policy. 
Monetary policy was also expansionary until the mid-1950s. A policy of low interest 
rates - which was made possible through monetary regulation – led to a vast increase 
of liquidity in the Swedish economy. 
 
The government revalued the krona in 1946 in order to weaken inflationary impulses 
from abroad. But after the revaluation, in line with the Beveridge plan and the post-
war  program  of  the  labour  movement,  the  government  undertook  a  series  of 
extraordinary measures to alleviate overheating, and to improve the trade balance.
13 It 
fought  domestic  inflationary  tendencies  in  1946-1948  through  profit  and  selective 
purchase  taxes,  price  controls  and  regulation  of  the  construction  sector.  Many 
measures  were  facilitated  by  regulation  instruments  developed  during  the  war.  In 
1947, the development of a large current-account deficit, due to the revaluation of the 
krona and the domestic-demand boom, resulted in import regulations. In the fall of 
1948, the government also managed to persuade the LO to accept a “wage stop” for 
1949 (in effect a prolongation of the 1948 collective agreements). An extension of the 
wage stop until 1950 led to increased tensions between the government and the LO. 
                                           
 
12 Sweden had been ruled by a broad coalition government during World War II. Immediately after the 
war, the Social Democrats formed a one-party government. Between 1951 and 1957, they joined a 
coalition government together with the Farmers’ party (Bondeförbundet). The Social Democrats then 
governed alone until 1976 when they were replaced by a non-socialist coalition government. 
 
13 Ernst Wigforss was Minister of Finance from 1932 until the summer of 1949. He was also the 




These  tensions  culminated  in  September  1949  when  the  government  devalued  the 
krona. The Swedish devaluation was caused most immediately by the devaluation of 
the British pound. The krona was devalued by 30 per cent in relation to the dollar, and 
by 13-15 per cent in relation to the currencies of Sweden’s main competitors on the 
export  market.  Soon  after  the  devaluation  (in  1950),  Sweden  joined  the  Bretton 
Woods agreement from 1944, which stipulated fixed exchange rates, provided the 
countries were not hit by major external imbalances. 
 
The  devaluation  of  1949,  in  combination  with  a  positive  demand  and  price 
development for Swedish export products during the Korean War, led to a surplus in 
the current account  and a profit boom for Swedish export industries 1950-1951.
14 
Sweden also experienced a wage explosion and a relatively high rate of inflation. The 
government  attempted  to  check  inflation  through  regulation  of  the  construction 
industry, price controls, stricter rules of inventory valuation, profit freezes and by 
levying duties on investments and exports. In 1952-1953, the pace of inflation was 
reduced  by  a  “mini  recession”  and  a  normalisation  of  export  prices.  But  the 
subsequent  recovery  entailed  overheating  again  in  1955-1956.  For  the  first  time 
during  the  post-war  period,  the  Central  Bank  (Riksbanken)  forcefully  tightened 
monetary policy, at the same time as the government tried to mitigate overheating by 
imposing investment fees and by phasing out the use of free depreciation allowances 
for machinery and equipment. 
 
Up to the end of the 1950s the post-war Swedish economic policy can be termed 
Keynesian.  As  in  many  other  Western  countries,  the  consecutive  Swedish 
governments  made  “full  employment”  a  priority,  full  employment  being  more 
ambitiously defined than during the 1930s. Fiscal policy was countercyclical, as was 
monetary  policy  from  the  mid-1950s,  but  with  a  tendency  to  expansionism.
15 
Governments tried to cushion the inflationary effects of their economic policies, and 
tendencies to deficits in the current account, through regulation, including voluntary 
incomes  policy,  and  by  extraordinary  fiscal  measures  to  weaken  the  incentives  to 
                                           
14 Export prices increased particularly for the raw materials industries representing more than half of 





invest, and to moderate price and wage increases in the most overheated industries. 
Indirect taxes, fundamental ingredients of the Rehn-Meidner model, were not used as 
a source of government incomes, with the exception of selective purchase taxes.  
 
 
4. The Golden Age 
 
4.1 The breakthrough 
 
Already in the late 1940s Erik Lundberg and Bertil Ohlin, who was now the chairman 
of the leading non-socialist party (Folkpartiet), wanted to conquer the stabilisation-
policy  failures  of  the  post-war  Keynesian  model  with  a  redefinition  of  full 
employment. Although receptive to the idea of active labour market policy, they came 
to advocate a general economic policy restrictive enough to stabilise nominal wages 
by giving up the high ambition of unemployment rates approximating 1-2 percent.
16 
In  contrast,  Rehn  and  Meidner  were  convinced  at  the  time  that  a  restrained 
macroeconomic  policy  could  be  conciliated  with  stronger  demands  for  full 
employment than those recommended by Lundberg and Ohlin. 
 
Throughout the hot controversy with the Social Democrat party over its economic 
policy in 1949-1950, the LO leadership came to support the new ideas of Rehn and 
Meidner.
17 However, at the time of the 1951 report, the LO leadership had not yet 
                                                                                                                         
15 The lack of countercyclical monetary policy was not a serious departure from Keynesian strategy. In 
fact, in the General Theory, Keynes had recommended  a policy of  steady low rates of interest to 
guarantee full employment (Keynes, 1936, pp. 375-6). 
 
16 Lundberg and Ohlin also referred, as did in fact Rehn and Meidner at the time, to the existence in an 
overheated  economy  of  excessive  labour  turnover  rates,  absence  from  work  and  disorganisation 
problems  in  firms  for  other  reasons  (bottlenecks  in  production  etc.)  having  negative  effects  on 
productivity (production per hour worked). Ohlin also emphasised that absenteeism under over-heated 
conditions  leads  not  only  to  disorganisation  problems  but  also  to  reductions  in  hours  worked  per 
employed (Ohlin, 1949, pp. 10-26; Lundberg, 1952a, p. 9 and 1952b, pp. 70-1).   
 
17 The LO Congress of 1951 sanctioned, although without any formal decision, the Rehn-Meidner 
guidelines for a new economic policy. The president of the Metal Workers’ Union, Arne Geijer, had 
opposed  the  solidarity  wage  policy  of  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  at  the  congress.  But  once  Geijer 
became president of the LO in 1956 he came to personify the support of the solidarity wage policy and 
also of the mobility-enhancing labour market policy. In the report of the LO economists to the 1961 LO 
Congress,  “Coordinated  Industrial  Policy”  (Samordnad  näringspolitik),  the  focus  was  on  structural 
change and economic growth, not on stabilisation policy as in the 1951 report. Meidner was then still 




abandoned its resistance to consumer taxes. The hesitation of the LO vis-à-vis indirect 
taxes throughout the 1950s contributed to delaying the reintroduction of general sales 
taxes  (Erlander,  1976,  pp.  265-74).  Further,  the  role  of  employment  offices  was 
actually reduced in Sweden in the 1950s (Wadensjö, 2001, p. 8). The Rehn-Meidner 
model received its real political breakthrough in the late 1950s.
18 In 1958 the Minister 
of Finance, Gunnar Sträng, became a supporter of sales taxes, reintroducing them in 
1961 (Erlander, 1976, p. 266). Together with Bertil Olsson, new head of the National 
Labour Market Board (AMS) in 1957, Sträng also became the chief architect of the 
expansion of labour market policy. 
 
A large-scale active labour market policy was introduced for the first time in Sweden 
during  the  recession  of  1957-1958.  The  policy  became  even  more  extensive  and 
comprehensive  in  the  recessions  of  1966-1968  and  1970-1972.  The  active  labour 
market  policy  share  of  GDP  and  of  central  government  expenditures  has  moved 
countercyclically since the late 1950s, at least up to the 2000s. But the share also 
showed a positive trend (even excluding regional policies) from the late 1950s until 
1973. Expenditures on active labour market policy measures as a share of GDP were 
higher in Sweden than in other OECD countries at the time of the first oil crisis. This 
period also saw an increasing share of Swedish expenditures on active labour market 
policies  allocated  to  measures  stimulating  occupational  and  regional  mobility  and 
improving the matching capability of labour markets; the share of demand-oriented 
measures  did  increase  only  in  the  recession  of  the  early  1970s.
19  The  increasing 
priority  given  to  supply  side  and  matching  measures  until  the  mid-1970s  was 
completely  in  line  with  the  Rehn-Meidner  idea  of  rapid  structural  change  and  a 
reduction of inflationary bottlenecks in labour markets. 
 
                                           
 
18 In his memoirs, Prime Minister Tage Erlander writes that he came to advocate the Rehn-Meidner 
labour  market  policy  at  a  meeting  with  the  LO  leadership  in  1955.  Per  Edvin  Sköld,  Minister  of 
Finance 1949-1955, was decidedly hostile toward the LO report. He warned against a reduction of 
company profits and a weakening of the economic responsibility of the trade union movement that 
would threaten the full employment policy and make a compulsory incomes policy necessary. During 
his term as Minister of Finance Sköld also opposed indirect taxation.  In 1955, when Sköld retired as 
Minister of Finance, Rehn and Meidner were finally rid of their main opponent. 
 





At  the  initiative  of  the  employers’  federation,  the  SAF,  in  the  mid-1950s,  wage 
negotiations in the blue-collar (LO) area were coordinated.
20 From the beginning of 
the 1960s up to the mid-1970s a radical equalisation of wages between and within 
different industries (and plants) and between men and women took place in Sweden. 
Pay equalisation between industries and plants was more far-reaching in Sweden than 
in  other  OECD  countries,  including  other  Nordic  countries.  The  adjustment  of 
women’s wages to men’s wages was, however, as comprehensive in Denmark and the 
Netherlands  as in Sweden (Ohlsson, 1980; Hibbs and  Locking, 2000). During the 
1970s widespread pay equalisation also occurred in the private white-collar field in 
Sweden through coordinated negotiations (Jonsson and Siven, 1984).  
 
Rehn and Meidner’s model yielded a strong economic-political alibi for putting major 
emphasis on active labour market policy and a wage policy of solidarity. There were 
many examples in the 1960s of union representatives on industry and local levels 
accepting the disappearance of jobs in stagnating low-wage industries (see textile and 
clothing industry in particular) referring to the need for labour mobility and structural 
change (Meidner, 1974, p. 64). 
 
Moreover,  it  seems  the  Social  Democratic  government  adhered  to  the  general 
economic policy of the  Rehn-Meidner model from the end of the 1950s until the 
beginning of the 1970s. Fiscal and monetary policy was still countercyclical - at least 
until the mid-1960s - but on average stricter than during the early post-war years.
21 
Fiscal  policy  (for  the  entire  public  sector)  was  only  mildly  expansive  and  even 
restrictive  during  the  recessions  of  1966-1968  and  1970-1972,  respectively.  The 
restrained macroeconomic policy, combined with the ambitious labour market policy, 
was in effect an approximative application of the Rehn-Meidner model for “normal” 
recessions. The two recessions were in fact “normal”, at least in comparison to those 
of  forthcoming  periods.
22  In  the  midst  of  the  1970-1972  recession,  Minister  of 
                                           
20  The  employers  took  initiative  to  wage  coordination  as  they  shared  the  Rehn-Meidner  fear  of 
inflationary  wage  races  in  an  overheated  economy.  Besides,  in  the  interwar  period,  the  SAF  had 
actually supported a wage policy of solidarity before the LO. 
 
21 Matthiessen (1971, p 176); Lindbeck (1975, p. 104); Jonung (1993, pp. 298-303 and 346-8; Calmfors 
(1993, p. 45). Currency regulations made a countercyclical monetary policy possible during the Bretton 





Finance Gunnar Sträng pointed out that a Keynesian expansionary policy instead of a 
selective employment policy would have resulted in higher inflation and thus in a 
deteriorating competitive power for Swedish companies (Ministry of Finance, Budget 
Bill 1971, pp. 19-20 and Revised Budget Bill 1971, p. 11). Sweden also refrained 
from a devaluation of its currency during the second half of the 1960s, contrary to the 
policies of Great Britain, Denmark and Finland. 
 
There  are  additional  signs  that  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  was  applied  in  Sweden 
during the 1960s and at the beginning of the 1970s. OECD’s standardized measure 
shows that Swedish unemployment was not much higher than 2.5 percent even in the 
recession  of  the  early  1970s  (OECD  Economic  Outlook  June  1985,  Table  R12). 
Furthermore,  Sweden  experienced  a  stronger  reduction  of  profits’  share  of  value 
added in manufacturing than other OECD countries.
23 In the 1960s and early 1970s, 
public  savings  as  a  share  of  total  savings  also  increased  markedly  in  Sweden,  as 
compared to other OECD countries. 
 
But the Social Democrats can hardly be said to have used the Rehn-Meidner model as 
a compass when designing the general economic policy from the end of the 1950s to 
the beginning of the 1970s. Fiscal policy (for the whole public sector) was, contrary to 
the Rehn-Meidner model, mainly expansionary in spite of the construction of a large 
public  supplementary  pension  (ATP)  fund  system  from  1959.
24  According  to  the 
guidelines of the model, fiscal policy became too expansionary during the economic 
booms  of  1965-1966  and  1968-1970.  Fiscal  and  also  monetary  restraints  to  keep 
inflation down (and to improve the current account) were introduced too late, and as a 
consequence, the following recessions became unnecessarily deep (Matthiessen, 1971, 
pp. 205-23; Tson Söderström, 1990, p. 63-7). Rehn praised Gunnar Sträng for having 
met  the  tendency  towards  increased  unemployment  with  an  active  labour  market 
policy and not with an expansionary fiscal policy (Rehn, 1977, p. 223). But the fact is 
                                                                                                                         
22 The Swedish recessions in the mid-1960s and the early 1970s were less severe than those of the 
interwar period but deeper than the ones during the previous post-war period. 
 
23 See Table 2 in Appendix. The profit share is equal to profits before dividends, taxes, interests and 
amortisations as a percentage of value added. 
 
24 In the  mid-1950s, Rehn  was a forceful agent in designing  the  Social Democratic proposal of a 




that the large active labour market policy program was the result of wrong timing of a 
Keynesian  “stop-go”  policy  rather  than  a  strict  application  of  the  Rehn-Meidner 
model.  Labour  market  policy  was  the  only  alternative  to  keep  down  open 
unemployment, considering the delayed employment effects of fiscal and monetary 
policies. 
 
The  tendency  to  falling  profit  shares  in  manufacturing,  during  the  1960s  and  the 
beginning  of  the  1970s,  were  not  the  results  of  a  strict  application  of  the  Rehn-
Meidner  program.
25    The  profit  decline  was  considerable  in  Sweden,  and  the  full 
employment situation probably contributed to the negative profit trend. But declining 
profit shares and low unemployment were international phenomena at the time, i.e. 
characteristic also for countries without a sizeable selective employment policy.
26 The 
absence of a Swedish devaluation during the 1960s - which could have neutralized the 
tendency to reduced profit margins in the exposed sector - was not mainly due to 
influences from the Rehn-Meidner model; Sweden simply had less external balance 
problems than countries that did devaluate.
27 
 
The LO wage policy from the mid-1960s was not only an application of the solidarity 
principles of the LO report - equal wages for equal work - but also a general support 
for low wage groups and low wage industries. The organisation was not successful in 
the 1960s and 1970s in negotiating a job evaluation system for the determination of 
just wage differentials. Instead a major part of wage equalisation during the 1960s and 
1970s followed the principle of equal wages for different jobs (Arai, 1994; Hibbs and 
Locking, 2000). The LO and Meidner were of the opinion that reducing wage gaps 
                                           
 
25 According to Erik Lundberg and Assar Lindbeck the negative profit tendency during the 1960s and 
1970s was partly a result of influence from the Rehn-Meidner model (Lundberg, 1985, p. 22; Lindbeck, 
1997, pp. 1291-2). I have chosen to play down further the impact of the model on the profit decline. 
 
26 The tendency to falling gross profit shares and gross profitability in Sweden was also effectively 
neutralised by tax relieves, in particular for large, capital-intensive enterprises. The profitability decline 
in Swedish manufacturing 1953-1972 is reduced with 50 per cent considering the development of profit 
taxes  (Södersten,  1971,  pp.  324-5  and  329;  Erixon,  1987,  Table  2.1).  It  seems  however  that  the 
tendency to a weaker profitability decline in the 1960s and the early 1970s, because of reductions in 
effective  taxes,  also  appeared  in  other  OECD  countries  (Södersten  and  Lindberg,  1983,  pp.  30-2; 
Erixon, 1987, pp. 52-3; Hoeller et al., 1996, Table 9). 
 
27 Finance Minister Sträng’s well-known distrust of devaluations (see Bergström, 1987, p. 196) might 




between  industries,  and  prioritizing  low  wage  groups,  was  in  agreement  with  the 
demand of the Rehn-Meidner model for a more just wage structure.
28 
 
To summarize, the Rehn-Meidner model was not consistently applied in Sweden from 
the end of the 1950s up to 1973-1974. But the period must still be seen as the golden 
era of the model considering the breakthrough of the active labour market policy and 
the  wage  policy  of  solidarity,  the  tendency  towards  reduced  profit  margins  and 
increased public savings, and the introduction of sales taxes (VAT). The question is 
whether the period was also a golden era for Sweden in terms of her economic-policy 
objectives of combining full employment and equity with price stability and economic 
growth. 
 
4.2 A golden age for Sweden, too? 
 
During the golden age of the Rehn-Meidner model, Sweden registered a historically 
high GDP per capita and labour productivity growth if the second half of the 1940s is 
excluded from the reference period (Erixon, 1991, p. 245, Table 1:1). Further, in the 
period of 1960-1973 Sweden was in the group of OECD countries with the highest 
labour productivity growth in manufacturing (Monthly Labor Review August 1991, 
Table 50; Erixon, 1991, p. 245, Table 1:2; Pilat, 1996, Table 3; U.S. Department of 
Labour, 2005a, Table 1.1).  
 
In the 1960-1973 period, the trade-off between inflation and unemployment was more 
favourable for Sweden than for OECD as a whole (OECD Historical Statistics 1982, 
Table 2.14, 2.15 and 8.11 and 1999, Table 2.15 and 8.11). Erik Lundberg maintained 
that Sweden’s beneficial Phillips curve was no evidence of selective employment-
policy  measures  making  Swedish  labour  markets  more  flexible  but  a  statistical 
phenomenon  –  labour-market  policy  had  reduced  the  recorded  rate  of  open 
unemployment  (Lundberg,  1985,  pp.  20-1).  However  Lundberg’s  view  that  the 
favourable  Phillips  curve  for  Sweden  reflected  a  statistical  disguise  of  open 
unemployment is controversial. The Rehn-Meidner strategy to combine low rates of 





unemployment with price stability does not rely on the favourable effects of selective 
employment policies on labour market flexibility. Rehn and Meidner took for granted 
that labour market policy, by guaranteeing full employment, would keep up the pace 
of  nominal  wage  increases  in  a  recession  and  also  in  the  medium  term.  It  is  the 
combination of labour market policies and restrictive fiscal policies, leading e.g. to a 
squeeze of actual profit margins, that constitutes, together with the wage policy of 
solidarity, the main Rehn-Meidner strategy to fight inflation without giving up the 
high ambitions of full employment.  
 
But there is no reason to overemphasize the success of Sweden and the Rehn-Meidner 
model in stabilisation policy in the 1960s and early 1970s. In fact, in 1960-1973, the 
unemployment record and the Phillips curve were equally, or even more, favourable 
in other small Western European countries. (These countries are Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Switzerland throughout the paper.) 
Thus  there  are  indications  that  stabilisation-policy  strategies  other  than  the  Rehn-
Meidner one had been  equally successful, or that the beneficial Phillips curve for 
almost all small Western European countries merely reflected their joint openness and 
related capacity of wage restraint and productivity growth. 
   
Furthermore,  there  are  no  reason  to  elevate  Sweden’s  growth  performance  or  the 
positive growth effects  of the Rehn-Meidner policy model in the 1960s and early 
1970s. In the 1960-1973 period Swedish GDP per capita growth was moderate in 
comparison to that in other OECD countries. A sharp increase in female participation 
rates had positive effects on Sweden’s relative GDP per capita growth, but the effects 
were offset by strong catch-up tendencies in less developed countries. Also, other 
small  Western  European  countries  belonged  to  the  OECD  group  with  the  highest 
productivity  growth  in  manufacturing.  Structural  change,  in  terms  of  changes  in 
industry composition, was not exceptionally strong in Swedish manufacturing in the 
1960s  and  early  1970s,  compared  with  that  of  other  small  Western  European 
countries, including the Nordic ones (see literature survey in Erixon, 2000). Besides, 
the importance of a restrictive macroeconomic policy and a radical solidarity wage 
                                                                                                                         
28 The 1951 LO report had in fact expressed scepticism against a systematic job evaluation and also 
argued for wage equalization between different occupations in the same manner as the LO in the 1960s 




policy (or an active labour market policy) for the high productivity growth in Swedish 
manufacturing shall not be exaggerated.
29 Sweden’s good productivity performance in 
manufacturing was mainly the result of companies’ rationalisation as a response to 
increased competitition from countries which had participated in World War II, their 
fast assimilation of new foreign (mainly American) technologies and the possibility 
for companies in small Western countries to exploit scale advantages when trade was 
liberalized (cf Erixon, 1997, Ch.5).  It must be noted, however, that the Rehn-Meidner 
model does not say that the pace of structural change increases with solidarity wage 
policy, not even if combined with labour market policy, only that this growth strategy 
imposes lower costs in terms of inequality and inflation in comparison with a “free” 
market strategy based on large wage differentials.  
 
The greatest victory of Rehn and Meidner’s growth theory during the golden era of 
their policy model was that reduced profit margins played an important role for the 
high productivity growth in Swedish manufacturing. Harder international competition 
in particular led to extensive rationalisations, mergers, and to closures of plants and 
industries with low profitability, which in turn created a basis for structural change. A 
stronger  downward  pressure  on  profit  margins  was  an  important  reason  for 
productivity  growth  and  structural  change  being  faster  in  Swedish  manufacturing 
during the 1960s than in the 1950s (Rydén, 1971, pp. 198-206; Wohlin, 1970, p. 109). 
 
The conclusion is drawn, although with some qualifications, that the period from the 
end of the 1950s to the early 1970s is the golden age not only of the Rehn-Meidner 
model but also of Sweden in terms of her objectives of economic policy. Swedish 
growth  and  stabilisation  records  were  not  exceptional  in  themselves.  However,  in 
Sweden,  radical  wage  equalisation  and  low  unemployment  proved  consistent  with 
satisfactory economic growth and relatively low inflation. During the period under 
                                           
29  Empirical  studies  of  the  1963-1985  period  indicate  that  the  wage  policy  of  solidarity  had  the 
expected effects on structural change in Sweden – employment expanded most in sectors with the 
highest initial wage rate and the lowest wage increase. The correlations in manufacturing were stronger 
in 1963-1975 than in 1975-1985, and stronger in Sweden than in the United States (Edin and Topel, 
1997).  It  also  seems  that  the  wage  policy  of  solidarity  increased  output  and  blue-collar  labour 
productivity in the Swedish business sector between 1964-1993 by speeding up the transformation of 
resources between plants and industries (Hibbs and Locking, 2000). But neither study estimated the 
relative  importance  of  solidaristic  wage  policy  for  Swedish  restructuring  and  productivity  growth. 




discussion, Sweden would have gained a top position in the OECD area according to a 
performance index based on all four goals of post-war economic policy. 
 
 
5. The Rehn-Meidner model during the turbulent 1970s and 1980s 
 
5.1 Challenges to and departures from the model 
 
In the 1970s, Sweden was hit, as other small Western European countries, by two oil 
crises, subsequent forceful demand shocks and by uncertain currency conditions after 
the collapse of the Bretton Woods system (1973). A restrictive monetary policy to 
reduce inflationary pressure after the two oil shocks, mainly in West Germany and the 
United States (at the start of the 1980s), led to a major crisis for Swedish export 
industries.  In  addition,  Swedish  companies  met  with  increased  competition  from 
Japan and new industrial countries operating in the world market for ships, iron ore 
and steel products. Also, the specialisation of exports in raw materials, semi-finished 
goods and investment goods was unfavourable to Swedish manufacturing during a 
period with deep international recessions. Export growth was lower for Sweden than 
for  all  other  OECD  countries  in  1973-1982.  However,  during  the  1980s,  Sweden 
could, like other Western European countries, benefit from a long-term boom in the 
United States, “the Reagan boom”.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s general economic policy in Sweden became on average far too 
expansionary  by  Rehn-Meidner  standards.  Discretionary  exchange-rate  policy 
measures, credit deregulation, export shocks, and, to a smaller extent, expansionary 
fiscal  policies  resulted  in  great  fluctuations  in  profit  shares  and  profitability,  and 
eventually  in  relatively  high  rates  of  inflation  in  Sweden  during  the  period  under 
review.
30  The  possibilities  of  using  monetary  policy  measures  to  affect  the  real 
economy were limited due to the policy of maintaining the value of the krona on an 
ever  more  globalised  currency  market.  Sweden  first  participated  in  the  European 
                                                                                                                         
structural  changes,  or  even  behind  changes  in  the  wage  structure  (see  Erixon,  2000,  p.  74  and 





currency cooperation after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, and then (in 
1977)  built  its  own  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates.  The  value  of  the  krona  was 
decided in relation to a basket of currencies, in which every currency reflected the 
importance of the country as a competitor to Sweden. 
 
A departure from the Rehn-Meidner macroeconomic policy occurred already in 1973-
1974 when Sweden experienced a positive demand shock without correspondence in 
other  OECD  countries.  (Finland  is  a  possible  exception.)  Rising  international  raw 
material prices and increased foreign demand for investment goods led to a profit 
boom in Swedish export industries in 1973-1974. The Social Democrat government 
did  not  exploit  the  opportunity  in  connection  with  the  breakdown  of  the  Bretton 
Woods system to alleviate the profit boom through a revaluation. In the mid-1970s the 
situation with “excess profits” turned into a cost and profitability crisis. The wage cost 
crisis weakened Swedish competitiveness, which in turn contributed to the country’s 
loss of market shares during the second half of the 1970s. The adjustment of nominal 
wages to the positive demand shock 1973-1974 provides one explanation for why the 
cost crisis and decline in profit shares after OPEC I and in the following international 
recession became more spectacular in Sweden than in other OECD countries.  
 
Erik  Lundberg  described  the  wage  explosion,  dramatic  profitability  decline  and 
extensive selective employment programs (see below) in Sweden in the mid-1970s as 
a parody of the Rehn-Meidner model (Lundberg, 1985, p. 26). In fact, from a Rehn-
Meidnerian perspective, the wage cost crisis was expected in light of the preceding 
profit boom. Furthermore, Swedish policy makers reacted to tendencies to stagflation 
in  the  mid-1970s  by  introducing  a  stabilisation  policy  with  strong  Keynesian 
elements. The “Haga agreements” 1974-1975 between the political parties and central 
labour  market  organisations  were  a  conscious  Keynesian  effort  to  reach  wage 
restraint.  The  expectations  behind  the  agreements  were  that  the  combination  of 
increased payroll taxes (aggravating the profit crisis in the short run) and reduced 
income taxes for wage earners would lead to lower central wage claims. 
 
                                                                                                                         
30 The fluctuations in profit shares since the mid-1970s have been larger in Sweden than in other OECD 
countries  with  the  exception  for  the  Netherlands,  Belgium  and  Canada,  see  Table  2  in  Appendix 




The so-called bridging policies of 1974-1976 in Sweden were a Keynesian effort to 
stimulate domestic demand during an international recession. It consisted mainly of a 
reduction of VAT in 1974, support to inventory investments (see below) and of the 
changed  tax  structure  of  the  Haga  agreements.  The  bridging  policies,  which  were 
praised by the OECD, were partly a Keynesian reaction to the Rehn-Meidner policy 
during  the  recession  at  the  beginning  of  the  decade.  (However  a  similar  bridging 
policy was concieved in Denmark and Norway.) In the mid-1970s, the general attitude 
of politicians and economists was that domestic demand had been too low during the 
previous recession. 
  
A  bourgeois  (non-socialist),  three-party,  coalition  government  formed  in  1976 
continued on the Keynesian road of devaluations, instead of introducing a policy of 
fiscal  and  monetary  restraints,  when  the  Swedish  deficit  in  the  current  account 
increased after OPEC I.
31 The non-socialist government devalued the krona once in 
1976 and twice (with almost 16 per cent in relation to the currencies of competing 
countries) in 1977. 
 
There is no reason to place too much stress on the deviation of the bridging and 
devaluation policies from the Rehn-Meidner model. The policies were adopted in a 
situation of exceptional recession tendencies and current-account deficits. Moreover, 




Irrespective of political colour, Swedish governments carried on ambitious selective 
employment programs during the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. The 
active labour market policy share of GDP and of central government expenditures 
increased in the recession in the mid-1970s. After a reduction during the recovery at 
                                           
31 The government in 1976 was formed by Centerpartiet (former Bondeförbundet), Folkpartiet and 
Moderata Samlingspartiet (Conservative Party). Folkpartiet formed a minority government 1978-1979. 
After  the  elections  in  the  Autumn  of  1979,  the  former  bourgeois  three-party  government  was 
reestablished.  In  1981  Moderata  Samlingspartiet  left  the  government.  After  the  elections  in  the 
Autumn of 1982 the Social Democrats recaptured all seats in the Cabinet. 
  
32 This conclusion is true for fiscal policy of both central government and the entire public sector. 
Statistics do not even unambiguously show that fiscal policy was countercyclical during the 1975-1977 




the end of the decade, labour market policy share of GDP and central government 
budget increased again at the beginning of the 1980s. The share of the labour force in 
labour market policy programs reached a  record level – 5 percent – in 1984 (see 
Johannesson, 1995, Table 2.2 and Table 2 in Appendix).   
 
Further, bourgeois governments from 1976 also embarked on a selective employment 
policy (or rather industrial policy) by subsidizing large enterprises in mining, iron and 
steel and shipbuilding industries to prevent plant closures and mass lay-offs. A non-
socialist government also initiated a nationalisation and reconstruction of the steel 
industry. The enterprises receiving extraordinary government subsidies had been hit 
by  a  worldwide  recession  and  increased  competition  from  Japan  and  the  NIC 
countries.  Similar  subsidies  were  paid  in  other  countries,  but  they  were  more 
extensive in Sweden than in e.g. Finland and Norway (Carlsson, 1983). Between 1975 
and 1983, Swedish industry subsidies amounted to 29 percent of the entire selective 
employment policy including regional policy (Johannesson, 1991, Table 1A and 1995, 
Table 2.1). 
 
There is reason to ask if the direction of the selective employment policy, during the 
second half of the 1970s and beginning of the 1980s, was indeed compatible with the 
Rehn-Meidner model. The increase of expenditures on active labour market policy in 
the  mid-1970s  was  first  concentrated  on  measures  to  maintain  labour  demand  of 
enterprises in order to avoid dismissals, mainly support to build up inventory and 
subsidies to in-plant training. The proportion of another demand-oriented measure – 
relief work programs (especially for youth) - increased the most, both absolutely and 
relatively, when unemployment rose in 1977 and in 1982-1983. There are arguments 
for not being too critical of Swedish employment policy during the actual period on 
Rehn-Meidner grounds. Despite extensive demand-oriented programs, mobility and 
adjustment measures did actually increase their share of total expenditures on active 
labour market policy in the second half of the 1970s.
33 The fact that labour market 
                                                                                                                         
restrictive or direct expansionary in 1977, thus at the trough of the Swedish recession (see sources 
under footnote 34). 
 
33  See  Table  1  in  Appendix.  Mobility  and  adjustment  measures  also  increased  their  share  of 
expenditures  on  active  labour  market  policy  in  the  second  half  of  the  1970s  if  regional  policy 
expenditures are included in the group of demand-oriented measures, see Johannesson (1981, Table 2) 




policy  became  more  demand-oriented  during  the  recessions  of  the  mid-1970s  and 
early 1980s was no serious violation of the principle of the Rehn-Meidner model; the 
possibilities  of  avoiding  a  major  increase  of  open  unemployment,  through  other 
labour market policy measures, were limited. However, the employment policy during 
the second half of the 1970s and early 1980s was probably too defensive to meet the 
model aims of rapid structural change. The subsidies to the “crisis industries” were 
definitely too large and lasted for too long from the perspective of the Rehn-Meidner 
model. 
 
Moreover, it is easy on Rehn-Meidner, and also on Keynesian, grounds to criticise the 
expansionary fiscal policy of the bourgeois government during the recovery of 1978-
1980. Fiscal policy became procyclical in spite of low real interest rates. During the 
1974-1980 period of high inflation, Swedish real long-term rates of interest were, like 
those of many other OECD countries, even negative. On the other hand, the strict 
fiscal policy by non-socialist governments during the recession of the early 1980s 
could be acceptable from the Rehn-Meidner perspective, in particular as the policy 
was combined with extensive selective employment policy measures. Fiscal policy 
was acyclical or even procyclical,  at least until 1982.
34 The non-socialist restraint 
policy during the international recession, which was also marked by increasing real 
interests, was an obvious violation of Keynesian bridging policy. In fact, influential 
economists had begun reviewing the Rehn-Meidnerian economic policy during the 
early 1970s recession as an ideal (Jakobsson and Herin, 1981, pp. 48-50). However it 
is dubitable whether the tighter economic policy in the early 1980s really was in line 
with the Rehn-Meidner model considering the depth of the recession.  
 
The “new” economic policy by bourgeois governments in the 1980s should be viewed 
against  the  background  of  high  inflation  after  OPEC  II  and  the  emergence  of  a 
structural public budget deficit, for both central and general government, during the 
recovery at the end of the 1970s. Monetarist (or “pre-Keynesian”) ideas of crowding 
out as an effect of a large public budget deficit and public sector, had also begun to 
influence  the  Swedish  economic-political  debate.  The  non-socialist  violation  of 





Keynesian economic policy of earlier decades was, however, not complete. In the fall 
of  1981,  during  a  substantial  capital  outflow  from  Sweden  due  to  a  deteriorated 
balance of payment situation, the government devalued the krona instead of allowing 
the Central Bank to increase the prime interest rate  
 
Soon after regaining government power in the fall of 1982, the Social Democrats also 
devalued the krona. Open unemployment had increased more during the recession of 
the  early  1980s  than  during  the  recession  of  the  mid-1970s.  Devaluation  was  the 
foundation  of  the  Minister  of  Finance  Kjell-Olof  Feldt’s  “third  way”  to  improve 
Sweden’s  current  account,  and  at  the  same  time  to  increase  production  and 
employment (Erixon, 1989). The devaluation policy was offensive in the sense that 
Sweden’s  competitiveness  had  already  been  restored  through  the  bourgeois 
devaluation the year before. High profits in the exposed sector were important means, 
along Feldt’s third way, to simultaneously increase overall employment and transfer 
resources to the private (primarily the tradeable) sector. The devaluation of 1982 was 
supported by the LO, but Finance Minister Feldt soon found it urgent to inform the 
parties on the labour market that compensatory nominal wage increases would not be 
corrected  by  new  demand-stimulating  measures.  The  “third  way”  of  the  1980s 
reflected a rebirth of pre-Keynesian ideas of public crowding out, but also a lingering 
influence  from  the  Keynesian  post-war  model  –  higher  employment  should  be 
attained by a devaluation, backed up by informal incomes policies to guarantee price 
stability. 
 
The devaluations of the early 1980s, reducing the value of the krona with 26 percent 
in  relation  to  the  basket  of  other  currencies,  along  with  a  strong  dollar  and  an 
international recovery, led to a new profit boom in Swedish export industries. The 
recovery of profit shares in Swedish manufacturing during the first part of the 1980s 
was strong by international standards (see statisticial sources of Table 2 in Appendix). 
Feldt’s profit-enhancing “third way” was a clear departure from the third way of the 
Rehn-Meidner  model.  A  Rehn-Meidner  adherent  would  perhaps  have  some 
understanding of the difficulty of anticipating the force of the international recovery. 
                                                                                                                         
34  See  Price  and  Muller  (1984,  Table  1),  Calmfors  (1993,  Fig.  11),  OECD  Economic  Outlook 
December 1994, 1995 and 1998, Table 30 and 31, Frank, Ohlsson and Vredin (1993, Fig. 5-6) and 




But the government did not revalue the krona in the mid-1980s, in spite of obvious 
signs of an overheated labour market and favourable external conditions in the form 
of a current-account surplus. 
 
The overheating of the Swedish economy took on new proportions during the second 
half of the 1980s, through a deregulation of the credit market. Under the existing tax 
system, the deregulation led to a credit-financed consumption, construction and stock-
market  boom.  The  competitiveness  and  profits  of  Swedish  manufacturing  were 
maintained  by  the  krona  losing  its  value  concurrently  with  the  weakening  of  the 
dollar. (The dollar was assigned more weight in Sweden’s currency basket than the 
U.S. share of Swedish trade.) Fiscal policy was predominantly countercyclical during 
the  boom  of  the  1980s,  but  not  enough  to  counteract  the  strong  tendency  to 
overheating.
35 It also did not become restrictive enough to eliminate the structural 
public budget deficit until 1987. The government tried to check inflation through price 
controls, and by appealing for wage restraint. In the middle of the decade, the parties 
on the labour market accepted to set a ceiling to wage increases through the so-called 
“Rosenbad rounds”. (Rosenbad is the name of the government office.) However, the 
pace of the wage increases was to break through the ceiling. When the boom reached 
its peak in 1990, the LO leadership (and the Metal Workers’ Union) also accepted a 
price, wage and strike stop. But the “stop package” did not get a majority support in 
Parliament,  which  in  turn  led  to  a  government  crisis  and  the  resignation  of  the 
Minister of Finance, Kjell-Olof Feldt. 
 
Stabilisation policy during the boom of the second half of the 1980s was a departure 
from the Rehn-Meidner model. It was based on an incorrect, if the model is to be 
interpreted  strictly,  combination  of  measures.  The  Social  Democrat  government 
attempted  to  control  inflation  by  incomes  policy  deals  instead  of  through  the 
introduction  of  forceful  restrictive  measures  (including  hard  currency  policy). 
Continued  low  unemployment  was  achieved  through  high  aggregate  demand,  not 
through substantial selective employment programs. The Rehn-Meidner model was 
followed  during  the  second  half  of  the  1980s  in  the  sense  that  training  replaced 
                                           
35 Fiscal policy during the boom of the 1980s was countercyclical both for central government (see 




demand-oriented programs as the most important labour market policy measure. (This 
reorientation of labour-market policy was obvious both in terms of expenditures and 
in  terms  of  program  participants  if  measures  for  disabled  persons  are  ignored.) 
Furthermore,  the  model  could  hardly  be  used  to  criticize  the  fall in  active  labour 
market policy share of GDP (and the share of the labour force participating in AMS 
measures) in the mid-1980s as such (see Table 1 in Appendix, Johannesson, 1995, 
Table  2.2,  Calmfors,  1993,  pp.  28-9  and  Ackum  Agell,  1995,  Fig.  2).  But  the 
dismantling of labour market policy in the second half of the decade was probably too 
drastic to satisfy the model’s recommendation for a severely overheated economy.     
 
There were other departures from the Rehn-Meidner model during the second half of 
the 1980s. A radical wage equalisation had occurred during the first half of the 1970, 
but  from  the  middle  of  the  1980s  wage  differences  were  allowed  to  increase 
substantially in the LO/SAF area (Hibbs and Locking, 1995 and 2000). Wage gaps 
widened, not only between wage earners with different qualifications and jobs inside 
industries (and plants), but also between wage earners with equal jobs in different 
industries (and plants) - a flagrant violation of the solidarity policy of the 1951 LO 
report.  In  1984-1985,  coordinated  wage  negotiations  between  SAF  and  LO  were 
abandoned. The departure from wage coordination was initiated by the SAF but it was 
supported by the Metal Workers’ Union. Central agreements for blue-collar workers 
were  settled  on  industry  levels  until  1998,  although  there  were  some  informal 
coordination among central trade unions on the initiative of the LO and an incomes-
policy parenthesis in the period 1991-1993 (see section 6.2 below).  
 
This section has emphasised the departures from the Rehn-Meidner model in Sweden 
from  the  mid-1970s  to  the  early  1990s.  According  to  the  yardstick  of  the  model, 
Swedish  macroeconomic  policy  became  too  expansionary  e.g.  by  contributing  to 
negative financial saving for the public sector. Further, subsidies to industries in crisis 
and some other selective employment policy measures broke with the principle of 
structural  change  in  the  Rehn-Meidner  model.  From  the  mid-1980s,  wage  gaps 
widened between workers with similar jobs.  But the picture of a deviation from the 
Rehn-Meidner  model  is  not  clear-cut.  To  prevent  open  mass  unemployment,  both 
                                                                                                                         




Social  Democrat  and  non-socialist  governments  pursued  an  active  labour  market 
policy, especially during the recessions of the mid-1970s and the early 1980s. 
 
5.2 Did the Rehn-Meidner model contribute to Swedish sclerosis? 
 
Inflation was much higher in Sweden from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s than 
during earlier post-war decades, an experience the country shared with most other 
Western European countries. In the period 1974-1990, Sweden was not exceptional by 
showing a higher rate of inflation than West Germany. In fact, during the second half 
of the 1970s, when the Phillips-curve correlation ceased to exist in the OECD area, 
Sweden’s average (annual) inflation rate was not particularly high in comparison to 
that in other OECD countries, and only slightly above that of other small Western 
European  countries.
36  In  the  1980s,  the  Swedish  average  rate  of  inflation  became 
higher than the OECD total, less the most inflationary member countries, and also 
than  that  of  other  small  Western  European  countries.  In  the  years  1988-1991 
Sweden’s rate of inflation came to deviate systematically from the OECD and EU 
total including the most inflationary nations.  
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, Sweden still lived up to the Rehn-Meidner model’s strong 
demand  for  full  employment,  with  a  possible  exception  for  the  recession  at  the 
beginning of the 1980s. Unemployment did not increase considerably in these decades 
as in the then EC countries, including the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark. The 
(annual) rate of open unemployment never rose above 3.5 percent in Sweden, even in 
the  early  1980s.  In  the  inflationary  years  1998-1991,  Swedish  unemployment 
approached  1.5  per  cent,  a  rate  that  the  nation,  however,  had  attained  at  several 
occasions during earlier post-war decades. In addition, from 1973 to 1990, the rate of 
labour force participation in Sweden increased from 75 to 83 percent, a higher rate 
than  in  other  OECD  countries,  with  the  exception  of  Denmark  (OECD Historical 
Statistics 1988, Table 2.15 and 2.20 and 2001, Table 2.6, 2.14 and 2.19). 
 
                                                                                                                         
Table 31 and June 2005, Table 30; Braconier and Holden, 1999, Table 5.2.5). 
 
36 In 1974-1976, thus in the era of the Keynesian bridging policies, inflation was actually lower in 
Sweden  than  in  weighted  OECD  and  EU  countries  and  even  lower  than  in  other  small  Western 




Sweden could even in the 1974-1979 period be compared to other small Western 
European countries in terms of the tradeoff between inflation and unemployment. In 
this period Sweden gave a stronger priority to full employment at the expense of price 
stability,  but  also  procured  a  rather  favourable  Phillips  curve,  in  comparison  to 
remaining small Western European countries. The return of the Phillips curve in the 
OECD area already in the 1980s suggests that Sweden opted for low unemployment at 
the expense of relatively high inflation, but also that the country was rather successful 
in solving the unemployment-inflation dilemma. The issue at stake is whether the 
practice and theory of the Rehn-Meidner model can explain why Sweden succeeded 
in sustaining low rates of unemployment in the second half of the 1970s and the 1980s 
and also in achieving a relatively favourable Phillips curve.  
 
The wage policy of solidarity may be an explanation for why deindustrialization in the 
1970s and the 1980s did not lead to high structural unemployment in Sweden (see 
below).  The  results  from  evaluations  of  1970s  and  1980s  labour  market  policy 
programs in Sweden are mixed. But it seems that labour-market training, in contrast to 
demand-oriented  measures,  was  neutral  or  had  even  positive  effects  on  regular 
employment.
37  Despite  all,  harmful  expenditures  on  relief  work  and  “defensive” 
demand-oriented measures directed to firms were only approximately half of total 
expenditures on active labour market policy in the 1970s and 1980s. The other half 
was constituted by matching and supply oriented measures and measures targeting 
problem groups in the labour market (Forslund, 1994; Calmfors, 1995). But labour 
market policy (and other selective employment policy programs) mainly contributed 
to a sustainable low rate of unemployment in Sweden by having prevented open mass 
unemployment  in  the  recessions  of  the  mid-1970s  and  early  1980s.  The  selective 
measures  of  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  limited  the  amount  of  hysteresis  effects 
(through long-term unemployment) in Sweden.  
 
                                           
37 See Calmfors et al. (2001, pp. 93-4 and 102-4). Swedish economists draw the conclusion that labor 
market policy as a whole, primarily by lowering search intensity and raising wage claims, had served to 
push  up  (real)  wages,  although  with  the  reservation  that  all  studies  have  not  shown  a  significant 
relationship (Calmfors, 1993). However, the Rehn-Meidner model does not dispute that labour market 
policy as a whole results in higher wages when compared with an open unemployment situation. The 
policy creates a labour shortage, and will therefore counteract its own tendency to limit the rate of wage 





But  from  a  Rehn-Meidner  viewpoint,  the  relatively  favourable  Phillips  curve  for 
Sweden in the second half of the 1970s was mainly temporary, especially as labour 
market  policy  measures  were  combined  first  with  devaluations  and  then  with 
expansionary  fiscal  policies  during  a  recovery.
38  From  this  perspective,  low 
unemployment rates were primarily maintained in Sweden in the 1980s by perpetual 
devaluations and other positive demand shocks. The fiscal policy was not restrictive 
enough  to  offset  the  positive  employment  effects,  and  the  upward  adjustment  of 
nominal wages not very fast, due to labour abundance in the initial state and relative 
wage preferences. Nominal wage growth was high in Sweden, but it took some time 
before the devaluation gains were eliminated (see Lindbeck, 1997, pp. 1310-1 and 
1308-9). The relatively  favourable Phillips curve for Sweden in the 1980s largely 
reflected  the  existence  of  delayed  nominal  wage  adjustments.  An  explanation  on 
Rehn-Meidner grounds of the slow adjustment of nominal wages to positive aggregate 
demand  shocks  focuses  directly  on  labour-market  conditions  -  labour  abundance 
slowed the pace of nominal wage increases after the devaluations in the early 1980s - 
and on the existence of delayed wage-wage spirals.  
 
Thus  a  Rehn-Meidner  theorist  can  support  a  hypothesis  that  Sweden  reached  a 
temporary state of low unemployment in the 1980s by climbing up the Phillips curve, 
that is, by excess aggregate demand. A persistent low rate of unemployment was not 
achieved by labour market policy programs in the first place, and definitely not by a 
successful  policy  of  wage  restraint  (see  Calmfors,  1993,  pp.  44-53  and  Lindbeck, 
1997,  pp.  1308-9).  The  stabilisation-policy  failures  of  Sweden  in  the  late  1980s 
support the Rehn-Meidner view that incomes policy is an inefficient instrument in the 
struggle against inflation in an overheated economy. This policy would probably have 
failed  even  if  wage  coordination  had  survived  the  mid-decade  strains.  Foreign 
economists friendly to the “Swedish model” often neglect the substantial wage-drift 
component of total wage increases in Sweden, even in the days of coordinated wage 
                                           
38 The wage cost crisis in the mid-1970s confirmed the Rehn-Meidner theory of high profits as having a 
destabilising role in an economy of the Swedish type. Incomes policy (see the Haga agreements) could 
not prevent a severe wage cost crisis in a situation where a profit boom and a considerable wage drift 




bargaining (Calmfors and Forslund, 1990, pp. 91-2; Holmlund and Zetterberg, 1991, 
p. 102; Nilsson, 1994, p. 9).
39 
 
The widening wage gaps during the second half of the 1980s also confirmed a Rehn-
Meidnerian hypothesis that Swedish redistribution policy was challenged not only by 
departures  from  coordinated  wage  bargaining  but  also  by  expansionary 
macroeconomic policies. In particular, devaluations led to high profits, and therefore 
to  high  wage  drift,  in  established  export  companies  in  the  mid-1980s.  The 
devaluations contributed to the decision of Metal Workers’ Union to withdraw from 
coordinated  LO-SAF  negotiations.  The  union,  organising  the  best-paid  blue-collar 
workers in manufacturing, regarded wage coordination as a straitjacket in a situation 
of large opportunities for wage increases. Its members had earlier been disfavoured by 
wage compression within blue-collar and white-collar worker groups respectively.  
 
The relation between the Rehn-Meidner model and Sweden’s growth performance 
from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s is ambiguous. This ambiguity reflects not only 
the fact that the model was only partially applied, but also that international statistics 
provide no clear picture of the Swedish growth performance in this period. Almost all 
OECD countries experienced considerably lower GDP growth in the 1973-1990 than 
in the period 1960-1973. But influential Swedish economists claimed that there was 
evidence of a slower growth rate in Sweden than in other OECD countries and that a 
growth lag was inherent in the “Swedish model” – incentives for firms and individuals 
had been distorted by public saving and extensive public transfers (including high 
replacement  ratios  in  social  insurance  systems),  high  and  inappropriate  taxes 
(including high progressive taxes on labour incomes), labour market legislation on job 
security, small income differentials, and centralized wage bargaining. Many features 
                                           
39  Foreign  economists  have  probably  overrated  the  wage-restraining  capacity  of  the  coordinated 
Swedish bargaining system (and also of the country’s “work-requiring” unemployment benefit system) 
in the 1970s and the 1980s, see Jackman et al. (1990, pp. 477-83), Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991 
Ch.9, Table 2, Nickell (1997, pp. 61-3) and Nickell et al. (2005, pp. 7-8). They often refer to regression 
studies showing that product wages are highly responsive to changes in unemployment in Sweden. But 
the parameter estimates for Sweden reflect the frequent use of devaluations, leading to lower product 
wages,  and  the  avoidance  of  open  unemployment  in  the  recessions  through  selective  employment 
policy. It also  seems that foreign economists  have exaggerated the  favourable effects of  mobility-
enhancing labour market policy programs on the Swedish Phillips and Beveridge curves in the 1970s 
and 1980s. After all, these programs engaged only a minor part of the Swedish labour force (cf. Edin 




of the “Swedish model” were created or reaching their peak in the late 1960s or in the 
1970s (see Lindbeck, 1997, pp. 1275-6). 
 
The specific Rehn-Meidner aspects of the “Swedish model” were  also accused of 
having obstructed economic growth in the 1970s and 1980s. The growing importance 
of public saving (until the early 1970s) was said to have led to misallocations of 
capital,  especially  in  the  form  of  overinvestment  in  construction  industries.  Some 
sceptical  observers  of  Sweden  maintained  that  centralized  wage  bargaining,  a 
necessary condition for the Rehn-Meidner wage policy, had resulted in less flexible 
labour markets. Compressed wages between skilled and unskilled labour in the 1970s 
and  early  1980s  were  blamed  for  having  weakened  incentives  e.g.  for  higher 
education.  In  addition,  the  wage  policy  of  solidarity  was  said  to  have  released 




The thesis of a Swedish “system failure” in the 1970s and the 1980s is not obvious in 
the light of comparative statistics on GDP per capita and productivity growth. It is 
true that in the period 1973-1990 Sweden’s GDP per capita growth was low, from an 
OECD  and  EU  perspective,  despite  a  continuing  huge  inflow  of  women  into  the 
Swedish labour market and a high rate of labour force utilisation (low unemployment) 
(OECD Historical Statistics 2001, Table 2.5, 2.8, 2.14 and 2.19). Sweden’s labour 
productivity growth was also low in this period compared to the OECD and EU total, 
both in manufacturing and in the business sector as a whole. Yet, in the 1973-1990 
period, productivity growth was higher in Sweden than in the United States, Canada 
and  the  Nordic  countries,  with  the  exception  of  the  catching-up  country  Finland 
(Monthly Labor Review August 1991, Table 50 and June 1999, Table 45; OECD 
Economic Outlook June 2005, Table 12; U.S. Department of Labor, 2005a, Table 
1.1).  Sweden’s  growth  lag  largely  reflected  a  catch-up  process  in  less  developed 
countries (see e.g. Agell, 1996, pp. 1763-4). In fact, 1973-1990, few countries passed 
Sweden in the “welfare league” based on OECDs latest figures on PPP adjusted GDP 
                                           
40 See Henrekson et al. (1996, pp. 265-77), Lindbeck (1997, pp. 1281 and 1295-7) and Davis and 
Henrekson (1997). See also Björklund and Kjellström (2002) for evidence of the Swedish decline in the 





per  capita  levels.
41  Thus,  comparative  data  on  GDP  per  capita  and  productivity 
provide no strong support for a hypothesis that Sweden was haunted by deep growth 
problems in the 1970s and 1980s, the heydays of the “Swedish model”. 
 
Neither does the criticism of the Rehn-Meidner model for having restricted economic 
growth in the 1970s and 1980s make an obvious point. An argument that smaller 
after-tax  wage  differentials  between  occupations  and  skills  have  weakened  the 
incentives for e.g. investment in higher education, hits the Swedish progressive tax 
system, and the practice rather than the principle of the Rehn-Meidner wage model, 
which demands equal rewards for identical jobs only.
42 The argument that the wage 
policy of solidarity, by putting a cost pressure on low-productive firms and stagnating 
industries, had released labour resources for the expansion of the public rather than 
the  private  sector,  ignores  the  fact  that  the  public  sector  predominantly  recruited 
people (primarily women) formerly outside the labour force. 
 
The growth argument against solidarity wage policy would be strengthened if the pace 
of labour mobility and structural change in Sweden could be shown to have slowed 
down in the 1970s and 1980s.  But labour market mobility (adjusted for the business 
cycle) did not fall in Sweden during the 1970s despite radical wage equalisation. In 
fact, in the 1970s and 1980s, regional mobility seems to have been higher in Sweden 
than in other Western European countries, though not in comparison to the United 
States  (Nilsson  and  Zetterberg,  1987,  pp.  35-52;  OECD  Economic  Outlook  1990, 
Table  3.3).  Furthermore,  in  the  1970s  and  1980s,  the  Beveridge  curve,  i.e.  the 
                                           
41 Comparisons of GDP per capita levels are complicated by continuous statistical revisions by the 
OECD, the OECD use of two PPP-adjusted measures, and the estimates by institutions other than the 
OECD. A rather unambiguous conclusion for the 1973-1990 period, however, is that Sweden’s position 
in the “welfare league” was rather stable and further, that the country passed Australia but was at the 
same time overtaken by Canada, Japan and possibly also by Norway (OECD, National Accounts of 
OECD Countries 2002, table B5 och B7; U.S. Department of Labor, 2005b, Table 1 and 2). 
 
42 Hibbs and Locking (2000) emphasises that general wage compression, in contrast to equal wages for 
equal jobs, has been negative for labour productivity in the Swedish private business sector. However, 
the argument that general wage compression resulted in a reduction of the return on investment in 
higher education in the 1970s and early 1980s has been questioned by some Swedish economists. They 
point to the same reduction occurring also in other countries, reflecting the increasing supply of highly 
educated  individuals  (see  Edin  and  Holmlund  (1995)  but  also  Lindbeck  (1997,  p.  1281).  Other 
economists have emphasized that higher relative wages for unskilled labour in Sweden has put pressure 
on wage earners, threatened by unemployment to get more education (Agell, 1999) and on companies 
to invest in labour-saving technologies stimulating the development of domestic industries producing 
such technologies for the world market (Erixon, 1997, pp. 66-7). 




mapping between the number of vacancies and unemployed (in relation to the labour 
force) was not only more favourable to Sweden than to all other OECD countries, but 
also shifted inwards, which was not the case in most other OECD countries (Jackman 
et al., 1990, pp. 477-83). Sweden’s relative Beveridge curve would probably have 
been  less  favourable  including  data  for  the  early  1990s.  But  there  is  no  strong 
evidence that the functioning of Swedish labour markets had been hurt by the wage 
policy of solidarity.  
 
In the 1970s, in the decade of progressing wage compression, the rate of structural 
change in manufacturing, in terms of changes of industry composition, slowed down 
in  Sweden  to  an  even  slower  pace  than  in  large  OECD  countries  such  as  West 
Germany and the United States (Erixon, 2000, p. 73). On the other hand, despite small 
wage differentials, the overall pace of structural change in manufacturing from 1978 
to 1988 was more rapid in Sweden than in other OECD countries, excluding Canada 
and the United States (Hansson and Lundberg, 1995, pp. 146-8). In fact, the wage 
policy of solidarity seems to have been not only compatible with, but also beneficial 
to, structural change. According to Lawrence Summer, workers who lose attractive 
high-wage jobs are less reluctant to accept jobs in other firms and industries if pay 
differentials of equally skilled labour are relatively small (Summers, 1986, pp. 370-
80). The compressed wage structure in Sweden made it easier for wage earners in 
high-wage industries, in a crisis, to accept employment in other industries (Erixon, 
1985, p. 27; Rehn, 1987, pp. 76-7, see also Hibbs and Locking, 2000). In the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the employment decline in crisis industries was, in spite of 
generous  subsidies  to  enterprises,  more  comprehensive  in  Sweden  than  in  other 
Western European countries (Erixon, 1985, Appendix 2).  
 
In addition, in the light of the growth theory of Rehn and Meidner, neither Sweden’s 
relatively weak productivity performance, nor her loss of market shares from the mid- 
1970s, came as a big surprise. Under the influence of e.g. the Rehn-Meidner model, a 
productivity  commission  drew  the  conclusion  in  the  early  1990s  that  the 
transformation pressure (omvandlingstrycket) on exposed Swedish industries became 
too weak in the 1980s. The devaluations weakened stimuli to rationalise, to introduce 
new products, technologies and organisations, and to transfer resources to expanding 




the 1980s, there was evidence in Sweden of a slower transfer of resources to R&D-
intensive industries and to industries with high (labour) productivity growth in general 
(Hansson and  Lundberg, 1995, pp. 79-82;  Lind, 2003, Table 3). A Rehn-Meidner 
argument that Sweden’s (modest) lag in GDP per capita growth in the period 1973-
1990  was  caused  by  devaluation  policies,  and  by  expansionary  macroeconomic 
policies  in  general  (including  credit  deregulation),  is  at  least  as  plausible  as  the 
argument about the negative effects of the “Swedish model”.
43 
 
A conclusion that Swedish productivity growth especially in the 1980s was restricted 
by macroeconomic policy failures does not exclude the possibility of an underlying 
long-term  growth  problem  in  the  Swedish  economy.  The  thesis  about  a  “system 
failure” in Sweden includes the argument that the country is strongly dependent on a 
few large global corporations, primarily in engineering, founded already before World 
War I or in the interwar period. These companies have gained from being owned by 
large private banks (through so called strategic pyramiding) and, at least until the 
1990s,  from  a  tax  system  favouring  retained  earnings  and  borrowing.  As  a 
consequence,  new  firms  have  been  crowded  out  on  capital  markets,  and  their 
expansion restricted by tax disadvantages for issued equity and individual ownership 
(Erixon, 1997, pp. 58-65; Henrekson and Jakobsson, 2001; Högfeldt, 2005). In the 
1970s and 1980s, non-agricultural self-employment, as a proportion of total civilian 
employment, fell in Sweden to a lower level than in any other OECD country (OECD 
Employment Outlook July 1992; Blanchflower, 2004, pp. 19-23).  
 
The wage policy of solidarity was accused of having strengthened the mature status of 
the  Swedish  business  sector  by  subsidizing  large  established  capital-intensive 
companies  and  eliminating  small  firms  with  a  large  growth  potential  (Davis  and 
Henrekson, 1997). But in the post-war period Swedish wage policy of solidarity was 
probably  a  subordinate  force  behind  firm  concentration  and  financial  locking-in 
tendencies (Erixon, 1997, pp. 25-8; Erixon, 2000, p. 77). The argument that solidarity 
wages were responsible for the early death of progressive firms is weakened by the 
fact that equal wages is also paid for equal work in a “free” labour market in the long 
                                           
43  Serious  overheating  during  the  1980s  probably  had  a  negative  effect  on  productivity  by  the 




run. In the Swedish case, large multinational companies and strategic export industries 
have, in their position as wage leaders, put a wage cost pressure on other firms and 
industries throughout the post-war period, regardless of the solidarity wage policy. 
 
  
6. Sweden’s road from full employment 
 
6.1 Depression and a new economic-policy regime 
 
At the start of the 1990s, Sweden experienced an economic crisis without precedent in 
the earlier postwar period or counterpart in other OECD countries at that time, save 
Finland. During three years (1991-1993) Swedish GDP growth was even negative. 
Labour force participation rates fell drastically in Sweden from 1990 to 1993. Further, 
standardised open unemployment increased from 1.7 percent in 1990 to 9 percent in 
1993, one percentage point below the EU average only. Thus Sweden entered the road 
to  mass  unemployment  as  other  OECD  countries  had  done  in  the  two  preceding 
decades.  
 
The Swedish (and Finnish) deep economic crisis at the start of the 1990s was to a 
great  extent  a  consequence  of  domestic  overheating  in  the  1980s.  In  particular, 
enterprises in the construction and service sectors (including real estate and financial 
services) had made very substantial investments during the credit boom of the 1980s. 
They were now facing reduced demand and falling stock market and real estate prices, 
e.g. as a consequence of increasing interest rates. Many enterprises, having borrowed 
to finance their expansion during the 1980s, had difficulties paying interest on loans, 
leading to bankruptcies and a very serious banking crisis. Furthermore, increased real 
interests  (and  payment  of  earlier  credits)  contributed  to  an  increase  of  household 
savings, which in turn was an important reason for the low GDP growth in Sweden 
during  the  first  half  of  the  1990s.  Higher  real  interest  rates  were  an  international 
phenomenon, reflecting a German reunification and a lower rate of inflation. But it 
was  augmented  in  Sweden  by  a  weak  confidence  in  the  krona,  a  result  of  the 
country’s relatively high rate of inflation in the 1980s. Real interest after tax did also 
                                                                                                                         




increase in Sweden through a tax reform in 1990-1991, which included a reduction of 
progressive income taxes. 
 
Swedish economic policy in the 1990s was shaped, not only by the deep recession at 
the beginning of the decade, but also by new rules of the game. The efficiency of 
fiscal policy in Swedish stabilisation policy was reduced by a decision in November 
1992  to  abandon  the  system  of  fixed  exchange  rates.  The  neutralization  of  fiscal 
policy  was  accentuated  by  a  continuing  globalization  of  financial  markets  and  a 
complete abolition of Swedish currency controls in 1989. But also the possibilities for 
using  monetary  measures  to  affect  activity  levels  were  restricted  under  a  flexible 
exchange rate regime by an introduction of inflation targets for the Central Bank in 
January 1993. The room for an expansionary economic policy was further reduced in 
Sweden  by  an  agreement  between  the  Social  Democrat  government  and  the  non-
socialist opposition in 1990 to apply for membership in the European Union. Sweden 
became a full member in 1995 after a referendum the previous year. Sweden is still 
outside  the  European  Monetary  Union  –  a  referendum  in  2003  clearly  rejected 
Swedish participation – but governments felt obliged to adhere to convergence rules 
of the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 and also of the Stability and Growth Pact of 1997. In 
addition, in the mid-1990s, a Social Democrat government restricted fiscal policy by 
defining ceilings for public expenditures and goals for public saving over the business 
cycle (see Section 6.3). The possibilities to achieve low rates of unemployment in 
Sweden by expansionary monetary and also fiscal policies were further restricted by 
constitutional changes making the Central Bank independent; the formal decision was 
made in 1998.  
 
The new economic policy rules in Sweden reflected a negative review of Keynesian 
stabilisation  policy  during  the  1970s  and  1980s.  They  were  also  influenced  by 
economic theories about rational expectations and time inconsistencies  in political 
decision-making, challenging the Keynesian post-war model, and in some respect also 
the Rehn-Meidner model. According to an influential argument, the Social Democrat 
government came to prioritise the struggle against inflation in 1990-1991, thus giving 
lower priority to full employment (cf. Lindbeck, 1997, p. 1303; Jonung, 1999, pp. 69-
                                                                                                                         




85; Holmlund, 2003, pp. 19-20). However, the argument is based on declarations by 
the  government  at  the  time  when  the  Swedish  economy  was  still  overheated,  or 
immediately after, when available information as to the depth of recession was still 
limited (Ministry of Finance, Budget Bill 1990, p. 12 and 1991, pp. 1-8). In fact, 
already in the 1950s and 1960s, Social Democrat governments had made similar shifts 
in economic-policy priorities over the business cycle. A change of stabilisation policy 
regime in a less state-interventionist direction was definitely taking place in Sweden. 
But the change was gradual, beginning already in the mid-1980s, by the dismantling 
of  instruments  in  monetary  policy  (see  the  deregulation  of  credit  markets). 
Furthermore, the policy shift in the 1980s and early 1990s was first of all a departure 
from  a  Keynesian  “accommodation  policy”,  guaranteeing  full  employment  by 
devaluations or expansionary fiscal policies, not from the objective of low rates of 
unemployment in itself. Already in the early 1980s, the Social Democrats had actually 
abandoned  an  expansionary  fiscal  policy  despite  a  relatively  high  rate  of 
unemployment.  However,  as  shown  by  the  party’s  expansionary  economic-policy 
program while in opposition in the 1990s, its incomes-policy intentions after having 
regained power and its countercyclical fiscal policy after the public budget crisis in 
the mid-1990s, the Social Democratic departure from Keynesianism was not definite.  
 
From the mid-1980s, leading Social Democrats and their economic-policy advisors 
were  certainly  influenced  by  “norm  economics”,  a  Swedish  version  of  neo-
monetarism. The norm economists emphasised the negative experiences of Swedish 
“accommodation policy” and the need for measures to reduce inflation expectations in 
the  country  by  strengthening  confidence  in  fixed  rates  of  exchange  (cf.  Tson 
Söderström et al., 1985 and Jakobsson, 2000, pp. 124-7). Their attitude to the Rehn-
Meidner model was ambiguous. Some norm economists saw the Rehn-Meidnerian 
stabilisation  policy  at  the  beginning  of  the  1970s  as  worthy  of  imitation  (Tson 
Söderström et al., 1985, pp. 36-7). They also underlined, e.g. by references to the 
Swedish  Productivity  Commission,  the  need  for  transformation  pressure  when 
opposing  devaluations  and  a  reduction  of  payroll  taxes  in  the  early  1990s  (Tson 
Söderström et al., 1992, pp. 13-4 and 49-53). The similarities between norm policy 
and the Rehn-Meidner model, however, should not overshadow the fact that the norm 
economists were critical of state intervention in general, a criticism that hit labour 




private  sector,  essentially  the  open  one,  most  Swedish  neo-monetarists  had  no 
structural objections to the devaluations of the 1970s and 1980s. Their main criticism 
of the Social Democratic devaluation in 1982 was that the following fiscal spending 
policy was not restrictive enough to guarantee a transfer of resources to the private 
sector  (Jonung,  1991,  pp.  14  and  32).  In  spite  of  the  devaluations,  general 
government’s share of total employment actually increased in Sweden in the 1980s.  
 
6.2 The only way 
 
In May 1991, the Social Democratic government decided to tie the krona to the ECU. 
The government wanted to convince the actors in financial (and also labour) markets 
that  devaluations  were  ruled  out.  Declarations  by  the  Social  Democrats,  at  one 
occasion together with non-socialist parties, that new devaluations were excluded had 
not prevented significant capital outflows from Sweden due to speculations against 
the krona in 1990-1991.  
 
The Social Democratic defence of the krona was in accordance with a Rehn-Meidner 
policy of price stability and transformation pressure. But from a Rehn-Meidnerian, 
and also from a Keynesian, point of view the Social Democrats should have pursued a 
loose fiscal policy at the first indications of a deep recession. In fact fiscal policy for 
the entire public sector was countercyclical during the dramatic recession of 1991 
(Braconier and Holden, 1999, Fig. 5.2.5; OECD Economic Outlook June 2001, Table 
31  and  June  2005,  Table  30).  However,  the  full  extent  of  the  recession  was  still 
unknown when the Social Democratic government fell in September 1991.
44 
 
The non-socialist four-party  government 1991-1994 used the concept of “the only 
way” to dissociate its economic policy from “the third way” of the Social Democrats. 
But in reality, “the only way” was only a continuation, although more explicit, of the 
                                           
44 The passive labour market policy in 1991 has sometimes been seen as confirmation that the Social 
Democrats downgraded the priority of full employment and also adopted the view by Swedish norm 
economists that wages and inflation had been forced up by active labour market policy (SOU 1993:43, 
pp. 38-9 and 47). But the main reason for the modest size of active labour market policy measures in 







Social  Democratic  challenge  of  a  Keynesian  economic  policy.  The  “new”  policy 
involved  deregulation  of  product  markets  (e.g.  for  telecommunications,  postal 
services and passenger air traffic) and cuts in social expenditures and income taxes 
(mainly on capital). It was also governed by an ambition to keep a tight fiscal policy. 
The purpose of reducing VAT in 1992 was not primarily to counter the recession, but 
to  adjust  to  the  tax  profile  of  the  EU  countries.  The  convergence  rules  of  the 
Maastricht Treaty in addition provided new arguments for an economic policy without 
devaluations and large public deficits.  
 
The  policy  along  “the  only  way”  failed,  however,  in  its  chief  task  of  creating 
confidence in the Swedish krona. The budget deficit of the public sector increased 
considerably during 1992. In 1993 it was larger than in any OECD country with the 
exception of Greece. The large increase in public deficit in 1992 was the result both of 
a recession (through automatic stabilisers) and, more importantly, of an expansionary 
fiscal policy in spite of the intentions of the non-socialist government to be restrictive. 
The budget deficit was an important reason for the currency crisis hitting Sweden in 
the fall of 1992. The Central Bank failed to prevent a major outflow of capital from 
Sweden.  The  government,  in  consultation  with  the  Social  Democratic  opposition, 
decided on two fiscal policy crisis packages to defend the krona. The crisis packages 
contained reduced payroll taxes to increase Sweden’s competitive strength, but also 
sizeable budget increases. The defence of the krona failed, and in November 1992 
Sweden abandoned the system of fixed exchange rates.  
 
However, fiscal policy (for the entire public sector) was not tighter in 1993 and still 
expansionary in 1993-1994 despite crisis packages and the non-socialist government’s 
ambition to reduce the  public budget deficit. The absence of  a strict fiscal policy 
indicates that the violation of the Keynesian post-war model was not complete in 
practice. Neither was the absence of a contractionary fiscal policy in a situation with 
increasing unemployment any breach of the Rehn-Meidner model. On the other hand, 
the abandoning of a system of  fixed exchange  rates,  and the reduction of payroll 
taxes, can be looked upon as a dismantling of Rehn-Meidner policy to fight inflation 
and to create transformation pressure; in fact, in her tenacious defence of a fixed 
krona and opposition to reduced payroll taxes, Minister of Finance, Anne Wibble, 




inflation targets for the Central Bank could simultaneously be seen as devices, in the 
spirit  of  the  Rehn-Meidner  model,  to  create  a  price-stabilising  framework  for 
employment policy, and to maintain transformation pressure. It is however dubitable 
whether the specific inflation target - 2 per cent inflation with an allowed flexibility of 
one percentage point in both directions - was in agreement with the high employment 
ambitions of the model. 
 
The non-socialist government carried on an ambitious labour market policy during the 
crisis. During the last years of the Social Democratic government, the active labour 
market policy had in fact not been very  active, despite increasing unemployment. 
Expenditures on labour market policy as a share of GDP rose considerably during the 
first  years  of  the  non-socialist  government  (see  Table  1  in  Appendix).  Continued 
prioritization of labour market policy by the bourgeois government meant that the 
share of labour force in active labour market programs reached a post-war peak in 
1994 (7.3 per cent). In addition, spending on active labour market policy in the first 
half of the 1990s was high in Sweden compared to other OECD countries, especially 
if adjusted for the rate of unemployment (Statistics Sweden 2000, Table 263; Nickell, 
1997, Table 4; OECD Employment Outlook, various issues). 
 
The orientation of labour market policy under the non-socialist government was also 
almost in full agreement with the 1951 LO report. Supply and adjustment oriented 
measures increased significantly in 1992. The training share of total expenditures and 
participants in labour market policy was reduced during the last two years of non-
socialist  government  when  (public)  relief  work  and  the  basically  demand-oriented 
work  experience  schemes  (ALU  projects)  and  youth  practice  programs  were 
expanded. But supply and matching measures were still the most important part of 
expenditures  on  active  labour  market  policy  (Table  2  in  Appendix;  Johannesson, 
1995, Table 2.2; Ackum Agell, 1995, pp. 70-3; Statistics Sweden, 1998, Table 306). 
The government also introduced a system of general employment subsidies in 1994, 
though the proposal was temporary and more limited in scope than what Rehn had 
envisaged. (The Social Democrats had in mid-1980s introduced a system of marginal 






“The only way” of the  non-socialist government showed similarities to the Rehn-
Meidner model, not only in its prioritization of labour market policy. It also, like the 
Rehn-Meidner model, expressed scepticism of incomes policy. The previous Social 
Democrat government had put great trust in the Rehnberg Commission, a mediation 
body set up when the economy was still overheated (1990). The commission managed 
to  bring  about  a  coordination  of  wage  negotiations  for  the  period  1991-1993, 
including almost all central labour market organisations.  
 
Possible  similarities  between  the  non-socialist  “only  way”  and  the  Rehn-Meidner 
model must not obscure the fact that employment policy during the first half of the 
1990s may have been too passive according to the criteria of the model. But a Rehn-
Meidnerian criticism of the non-socialist government must concentrate on the new 
restrictions on general economic policy, or on the scope and character of selective 
employment programs, not on the actual fiscal policy. In the period 1991-1994 fiscal 
policy  was,  although  not  deliberately,  expansionary  and  largely  countercyclical, 
contributing significantly to the size of the Swedish public budget deficit. The non-
socialist government was too divided to embark on a fiscal policy along its own “only 
way”. 
 
6.3 A new Social Democratic economic policy  
 
While in opposition the Social Democrats had criticized the non-socialist government 
for making the fight against inflation a priority, and for its unwillingness to see low 
domestic demand as the main problem of the Swedish economy. Until early 1994 the 
party therefore advocated a Keynesian program of higher public consumption and 
investment. Employment had fallen drastically in the public sector in the years of the 
bourgeois government. However the Social Democratic government, taking over in 
September 1994, was to implement the fiscal policy restraint that the non-socialist 
government had started but not had the strength or political support to fully realize. 
The restrictive policy of the Social Democrats was to a larger extent constituted by 





The Social Democratic fiscal policy of the mid-1990s can safely be called the largest 
system change in Swedish economic policy since the early 1930s.
45 The party that had 
pioneered  the  Keynesian  revolution  now  introduced  an  extremely  restrictive  fiscal 
policy in a situation of mass unemployment. The Social Democratic fiscal restraint 
1995-1998, with Göran Persson as Prime Minister (Minister of Finance 1994-1996), 
has no equivalent in other OECD countries in the period of comparative statistics 
from 1970 and onward (Price and Muller, 1984, Table 1; OECD Economic Outlook 
June 1997 and 2001, Table 31 and June 2005, Table 30; Braconier and Holden, 1999, 
pp.  24-7).  In  1998,  the  public  budget  deficit  disappeared  through  an  international 
recovery and, above all, through a restrictive fiscal policy.  
 
The ambition of the Social Democrats to meet the Maastricht convergence criteria had 
been strengthened by the party’s participation in the campaign for membership of the 
EU, and by Sweden joining the union in 1995. The government support of a strict 
fiscal policy also built on new economic theories emphasising the value of moderating 
expected inflation. In 1994 and 1995 the gap between Swedish and German long-term 
interest  rates  had  risen  again  after  a  decline  in  1991-1993.  The  Social  Democrat 
government  shared  the  view  of  Swedish  economists  that  expectations  of  a 
depreciation of the krona were due to the large public deficit. The government also 
felt than an elimination of the public budget deficit could increase employment   – 
lower inflation expectations would lead to lower rates of interest, and thus stimulate 
GDP through higher investments (Ministry of Finance, 1995; Swedish Government, 
1996).  
 
The restrictive fiscal policy of the Social Democratic Cabinet in a situation of high 
unemployment was inconsistent, not only with the Keynesian, but also with the Rehn-
Meidner model. Erik Lundberg’s labelling the economic policy of the mid-1970s a 
parody of the Rehn-Meidner model holds some truth also for the economic policy of 
the mid-1990s. The Social Democratic government now combined an exceptionally 
restrictive fiscal policy with substantial labour-market policy measures (see below). 
                                           
45 The Social Democrats received support in parliament for its fiscal restraint, first from the Left Party 
(former Communist Party) and then (from January 1995) from the Center Party (Centerpartiet). From 
Autumn 1998, the Social Democrats have been supported in its economic policy by the Left Party and 





Besides, the Central Bank, governed by the inflation targets from 1995, pursued a 
tight monetary policy until the beginning of 1997.
46 But this economic policy deviates 
from what Rehn and Meidner recommended in a situation of mass unemployment. 
What more is, the Social Democratic theory of positive GDP and employment effects 
of  a  restrictive  fiscal  policy  was  not  even  anchored  in  modern  economics.  Fiscal 
policy is an ineffective instrument for affecting GDP and employment under flexible 
exchange  rates,  even  in  the  short  run.  Furthermore,  according  to  theories  of  a 
convergence to a natural rate of unemployment, the effects of a restrictive economic 
policy  on  output  and  employment  are  temporary  and  negative  only.  In  addition, 
qualified macroeconomic theories say that a possible reduction in expected inflation 
has ambiguous effects on real interest rates (Blanchard, 2005, pp. 469-71).  
 
Parts of the Rehn-Meidner model survived the definite “system change” in Sweden in 
the mid-1990s. The Social Democratic government, like the previous non-socialist 
government,  engaged  in  an  ambitious  labour  market  program.  In  line  with  the 
priorities  of  the  Rehn-Meidner  model,  public  relief  work  became  gradually  less 
important from the mid 1980s, to be finally abolished in the 2000s (until 2006). In 
1996 and 1997, the demand-oriented ALU projects involved more people than the 
training  programs  in  labour  market  policy.  This  development  could  be  seen  as  a 
deviation from the Rehn-Meidner program in a situation of excess demand for highly 
skilled people in the Swedish economy (see particularly the IT-boom in Sweden in the 
late 1990s). But expenditures on supply and matching oriented measures were still 
larger  than  spending  on  other  active  labour  market  policy  measures.  Furthermore, 
from  1998,  participating  in  labour  market  training  was  again  to  dominate  labour 
market policy, if programs for handicapped people are excluded. Since 2001 training 
programs  have  largely  been  substituted  by  special  councelling  and  placement 
measures  for  long-term  unemployed  (aktivitetsgarantin).  This  change  of  Swedish 
labour market policy was not really a break with the supply and adjustment oriented 
Rehn-Meidner  model.  The  remarkable  "Knowledge  Boost”  (Kunskapslyftet)  1997-
2002, to increase the level of education and to reduce unemployment among adults 
with  only  grammar  school  education,  was  in  line  with  the  supply-oriented  Rehn-
                                           
46 The character of Swedish monetary policy in the 1990s and the following decade is here defined by 
estimates  of  the  difference  between  the  Central  Bank  prime  rate  and  nominal  GDP  growth,  see 




Meidner model. The program encompassed 2 percent of the working age population 
by the end of the first year (Holmlund, 2003, p. 7). 
 
The government had also introduced a form of temporary employment subsidies in 
1995 – firms recruiting the unemployed were given financial assistance. Furthermore, 
the increasing weight of employment subsidies in Swedish labour market policy since 
1998 can be regarded as a late breakthrough for a crucial feature of the Rehn-Meidner 
model.  In  1997,  employment  subsidy  grants  embraced  only  1.9  percent  of  all 
individuals engaged in labour market policy programs financed by AMS and other 
public authorities. In 2003, this share had rosen to 17.5 percent (Statistics Sweden 
2005, Table 356). Also, in 2005, the Social Democrats extended their employment 
subsidy program for long-term unemployed, and decided to stimulate employment in 
small  firms  by  similar  measures.  (The  non-socialist  opposition  suggested  similar 
recruitment grants to combat unemployment.) 
 
But the relation between the Rehn-Meidner model and the Social Democratic labour 
market policy from the mid-1990s was ambiguous.
47 Firstly, the share of the labour 
force engaged in labour market policy programs steadily decreased in Sweden from 
the mid-1990s until 2004. Swedish expenditures on labour market policy as a share of 
GDP showed a similar decline. To a large extent, the weaker emphasis on labour 
market  policy  reflected  improved  labour  market  conditions  from  1998.  But 
expenditures on active labour market policy programs as a share of GDP became 
lower in Sweden than in two countries with less unemployment. In 2000, Denmark 
and the Netherlands replaced Sweden as the leading countries of active labour market 
policy.
48 It cannot be excluded, however, that Sweden’s lower ranking is explained by 
an increasing weight of employment policy measures by other public authorities than 
the AMS (see for example the “Knowledge Boost”). In any case, lower priority of 
                                           
47 A similar ambiguity appears in the case of Social Democratic attempts to reduce the “natural” rate of 
unemployment and NAIRU in the mid-1990s (see further above). Exceptions to the Job Security Act 
and lower replacement ratios could be seen as measures to stimulate labour supply and labour-market 
flexibility  in  accordance  with  the  Rehn-Meidner  model.  However,  these  measures  might  also  be 
regarded as challenges to the model by weakening the bargaining position of labour. 
 
48  Further,  in  the  period  1999-2002,  subsidies  to  regular  employment  in  the  private  sector 
recommended by Rehn and Meidner were higher in Belgium, Italy and Spain than in Sweden as a share 
of GDP. This share  was also approximately as high in Finland, France and Canada  as in Sweden 




AMS  programs  meant  that  the  government  was  not  prepared  to  meet  increasing 
unemployment  in  2002-2003  or  the  slow  employment  recovery  in  the  following 
export-led expansion. 
 
Secondly, the Social Democratic scheme of employment subsidies in 1995 can, as can 
the non-socialist program, be criticised on Rehn-Meidner grounds for being temporary 
and too small. The former subsidies were limited by their non-universal character, that 
is,  subsidies  were  paid  to  the  unemployed  only.  (By  being  given  also  for  the 
reemployed  the  subsidies  were  not  even  marginal.)  In  a  similar  manner,  the 
employment subsidy programs from 1998 have, on the recommendations of labour-
market  economists,  targeted  long-term  unemployed  and  older  people  to  minimize 
crowding-out effects (see the evaluations of labour market policy in next section).  
 
A similar ambiguity attaches to the relation between the Rehn-Meidner model and the 
fiscal  policy  after  the  public  budget  crisis  in  the  mid-1990s.  The  government 
introduced some disciplinary budget reforms, which can be seen as an (unconscious) 
application of the model. In 1995 it decided to introduce a ceiling for expenditures by 
central  governments,  effective  from  1997.  The  ceiling  covered  all  items  in  the 
national budget including social insurances (but excluding interest on the government 
debt). In addition, the Social Democrat government has had a fiscal policy target since 
1997 that the consolidated public budget must show a surplus of 2 percent of GDP 
over a business cycle. This budget reform was clearly in accordance with the Rehn-
Meidner model. One government motif for a public budget surplus over the business 
cycle  was  also  in  conformity  with  the  Rehn-Meidner  view  –  the  surplus  makes 
countercyclical  fiscal  policy  possible  without  big  budget  deficits  in  a  recession 
(Ministry of Finance, 2000, pp. 29-30). But the government did not formulate a Rehn-
Meidner argument of public savings to replace savings in domestic enterprises for 
reasons of stabilisation, distribution and growth. 
 
The disciplinary budget reforms and the ambition to keep down inflation expectations 
reduced, together with restrictions on fiscal policy under flexible exchange rates, the 
possibilities and willingness of the Social Democratic government to speed up the 
employment recovery in the late 1990s by introducing expansionary fiscal measures. 




policy from the late 1990s, using the Rehn-Meidner model as a norm. Fiscal policy 
has for the entire public sector been restrictive, though mainly countercyclical (see 
OECD Economic Outlook June 2005, Table 30 and also von Hagen and Bruckner, 
2002, pp. 140-3). The demand-stimulating central government fiscal policy in 2001 
and 2002 was in accordance with a Rehn-Meidnerian (and Keynesian) policy for a 
recession in which unemployment was high by Swedish standards. Neither was the 
direction of monetary policy from the late 1990s a serious challenge to the Rehn-
Meidner model, considering the employment situation in the country. The policy of 
the Central Bank was not only countercyclical during the first half of the 2000s, but 
also mostly expansive from 1997. 
 
At the same time there were indications of a political business-cycle behaviour by the 
Social Democratic government. The Social Democrats decided upon an expansionary 
fiscal policy before the elections in 1998, 2002 and 2006 (announced in 2005).
49 The 
election policy was a threat to the self-imposed budget goals of the government, but 
also quite alien to the disciplinary economic policy of the Rehn-Meidner model.  
 
A Rehn-Meidner criticism of the new economic policy in Sweden must concentrate 
on the tendencies to a political business cycle and on the size and composition of 
labour-market  policy  programs,  including  employment  subsidies.  It  can  also  be 
directed towards the level of ambition in employment policy as such. In 1996, the 
Social  Democrats  set  up  the  same  goal  for  unemployment  as  in  fact  the  former 
bourgeois  government  -  to  reduce  open  unemployment  to  4  percent  before  2000. 
There are indications that the government agreed with some Swedish economists and 
the OECD that the equilibrium rate of unemployment and NAIRU had increased in 
Sweden in the 1970s and 1980s, due e.g. to higher replacement ratios and declining 
wage coordination, and also in the first half of the 1990s (Revised Budget Bill 1995, 
                                           
49 Some examples of a procyclical fiscal policy under the Social Democrat government, even after the 
mid-1990s,  reflected  a  book-accounting  view  of  fiscal  policy  –  the  government  declared  that 
improvements in the budget balance provided room for welfare reforms and for compensations to low-
income groups for earlier fiscal restraints (see Ministry of Finance, Budget Bill 1998, pp. 19-20 and 
Revised Budget Bill 1998, pp. 27-8, 1999, p. 24, 2000, p. 19 and 2001, pp. 19-20). Both election and 
book-accounting considerations explain (together with a strong pressure from the LO) the decisions by 
the  Social  Democrats  in  the  election  year  of  1998  to  reduce  income  taxes  and  increase  public 
expenditures, e.g. by raising replacement rates to its pre-1995 level (from 75 to 80 percent). These 





Appendix 1.1, p. 91 and Budget Bill 1996, Appendix 1, p. 38). The Social Democrats 
therefore accepted the need for structural reforms in the mid-1990s (Revised Budget 
Bill 1995, p. 31). The government decided on further reductions in unemployment 
benefits - the bourgeois government had reduced the replacement ratio in 1993 - and 
exceptions from the Job Security Act of 1974 by allowing short-time employment 
contracts. (The reduction of the replacement ratios was, however, primarily a part of 
the budget consolidation policy.)  
 
The  employment  policy  ambition  of  the  Social  Democrats  –  4  percent  open 
unemployment - was satisfied in 2000, but it was definitely too modest to meet the 
strong demands of the Rehn-Meidner model. Hence it seems that the redefinition of 
full  employment  by  Bertil  Ohlin  and  Erik  Lundberg  in  the  early  post-war  years 
eventually had won the day.  
 
The Social Democratic abandoning of the goals of very low rates of unemployment, 
and of expansionary macroeconomic policies to attain a strong employment recovery, 
was a clear challenge to Keynesianism in Sweden. But there were reminiscences of 
the Keynesian post-war model in the new stabilisation-policy regime of the 1990s – 
incomes policy. The Social Democrats again brought the idea of incomes policy onto 
the political agenda, after the non-socialist parenthesis. The government had plans for 
tripartite wage negotiations in the mid-1990s, plans that were hardly compatible with 
the Rehn-Meidner recommendation that the trade union movement should not take 
responsibility for the stability of the national economy, especially in a situation of 
high  profits  (see  below).  Further,  the  plans  were  inconsistent  with  the  Swedish 
tradition of wage negotiations without government interventions dating from the late 
1930s. There was also some inconsistency between the government’s corporate plans 
for  wage  restraint  and  its  declarations  that  Sweden  should  not  compete  with  low 
wages. However, the government did not realise its plans for tripartite negotiations, 
but instead in 2000 set up a separate mediation institute.  
 
In the first half of the 1990s, the LO and other parties on the labour market, of their 
own  initiative  had  worked  out  a  wage  policy  program  according  to  which  wage 
increases  on  a  Western  European  level  would  reduce  long-term  interest  rates  by 




through  appreciations,  once  the  confidence  in  the  krona  was  increased,  although 
ideally within limits to secure high profit shares (The Edin Group, 1995, pp. 33-4). 
However, the LO became no part of an incomes policy agreement in the second half 
of the 1990s and the early 2000s. A bargaining agreement between central labour 
market  organisations  in  manufacturing,  the  so-called  Industrial  Agreement 
(Industriavtalet) was signed in 1997. Agreements are settled for three-year periods 
stipulating  wage  moderation  in  order  to  keep  up  Swedish  competitive  strength  in 
terms  of  relative  unit  labour  costs  and  profit  margins  of  the  exposed  sector. 
Negotiations take place under the whip of the explicit inflation targets for the Central 
Bank (cf. Carling et al., 2000 and  Industrins Ekonomiska Råd, 2003). Today, the 
Industrial  Agreement  has  counterparts  in  other  sectors  of  the  Swedish  economy. 
However,  the  Industrial  Agreement  was  expected  to  serve  as  guideline  for  wage 
negotiations outside manufacturing.  
 
The  Industrial  Agreements  have  hitherto,  if  compared  to  the  Rehn-Meidner 
recommendations, put greater emphasis on stabilisation than on distribution. Also, 
wage coordination for individual sectors has restricted the possibilities to pursue a 
comprehensive wage policy of solidarity. Besides, there is no analogy  in the new 
wage philosophy to the Rehn-Meidner growth theory, in which high profit margins 
have a negative effect on productivity. The initiators of the agreements also have a 
greater  faith  than  Rehn  and  Meidner  in  the  ability  of  central  labour  market 
organisations to influence the general wage development, even in a situation of high 
profits.  
 
An obvious challenge to the priorities of the Rehn-Meidner model was the further 
increase in wage differentials among blue-collar workers in the Swedish private sector 
in the first half of the 1990s. Wage dispersion increased the most between industries 
and plants, compromising fairness in the terms of the original notion of solidaristic 
wage policy (Hibbs and Locking, 2000, Fig. 1). As in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, there was also a  continued increase in the dispersion of  gross earnings 
between all workers in Sweden (OECD Employment Outlook 1996, pp. 61-3). In the 
period  1995-2002  wage  gaps  between  blue-collar  workers  in  the  private  business 
sector was first stable, but then actually decreased in the early 2000s. However, in the 




and also between white-collar and blue-collar workers (Lundborg, 2005). The relative 
wage development in Sweden since the mid-1990s has primarily challenged the policy 
of general wage compression beyond the Rehn-Meidner model. But wage gaps also 
grew  between  employees  in  the  public  and  private  sector  until  the  early  2000s, 
indicating  a  simultaneous  departure  from  the  model’s  principle  of  equal  pay  for 
identical jobs. 
 
There were other departures from the Rehn-Meidner model in the 1990s and the early 
years of the new millennium. In 1998, pension reform agreement between the Social 
Democratic  government  and  the  non-socialist  opposition  reduced  the  element  of 
public saving in the Swedish social insurance system. In the mid-2000s, securities and 
shares owned by individuals, but administrated by a national authority (PPM), were 
responsible  for  more  than  half  of  total  savings  in  the  Swedish  pension  system 
(Ministry of Finance, Budget Bill Spring, 2005, Table 4.18).  
 
The  most  important  new  challenge  in  Sweden  to  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  in  the 
1990s and 2000s, beside the departure from full employment, was the confirmation of 
a tendency to higher profits share of GDP in the business sector. According to the 
Rehn-Meidner model, high profit shares are undesirable not only from an income-
distribution  point  of  view.  They  are  also  a  source  of  low  economic  growth  and 
macroeconomic destabilisation. In fact, the increase in profits share in manufacturing 
from the mid-1970s to the early 2000s was arguable stronger in Sweden, Finland and 
Canada than in other OECD countries (see Table 2 in Appendix). The boost in profits 
share was exceptional in Swedish manufacturing during the first part of the 1990s. In 
the first year of floating exchange rates (1993), the krona was depreciated with 25 
percent  against  the  currencies  of  competing  countries.  The  depreciation  explains, 
together with strong productivity growth and higher rates of unemployment, why the 
profit share in Swedish manufacturing rose to higher levels in the mid-1990s (above 
40 percent) than ever before in the post-war period. (I disregard here the profit boom 
during the Korean War.) What more is, the profit share remained on a high level 
despite an appreciation of the krona in 1995-1996 and a falling rate of unemployment 
in 1998-2001. The profit boom was consolidated in the late 1990s and early 2000s by 
continuing  productivity  increases,  and  by  a  weaker  krona,  which  particularly 




1990s and the 2000s compared to earlier decades is a salient structural condition for 
the upward shift of profit shares in Sweden.  
  
In conclusion, the relationship between the actual economic and wage policy of the 
1990s and 2000s and the Rehn-Meidner model is fraught with contradictions. There 
are signs that Social Democratic, as well as non-socialist, governments had taken over 
- without reference to the model - its basic idea of stabilisation; that full employment 
must be reached within the framework of a restrictive macroeconomic policy. Explicit 
inflation and budget targets, and also Central Bank independency, could be seen as 
price-stabilising frameworks for an active employment policy. Social Democratic and 
also  non-socialist  governments  pinned  their  hopes  on  labour  market  policy  in  the 
1990s, thus during a decade when theories of the limitations of an interventionist 
economic policy received their definite breakthrough.  
 
But there were clear divergencies from the Rehn-Meidner model in the 1990s and the 
2000s.  Sweden  no  longer  met  the  strong  requirements  of  full  employment  in  the 
model. Besides, the decline in labour force participation rates was a divergence from 
the active employment policy of the model. The inflation targets for the Central Bank 
are probably too demanding to satisfy the high employment ambitions of the Rehn-
Meidner model. The  restraining fiscal and monetary policy in the mid-1990s in a 
situation of mass unemployment was the clearest expression of a departure from the 
priorities and means of the Rehn-Meidner model. The reduction of expenditures on 
labour market policy as a share of GDP in the second half of the 1990s, even though 
unemployment was still high, was another violation of the ideas of Rehn and Meidner. 
From the viewpoint of their model there was also an unwarranted boost in the profits 
share of GDP. A continuing wage spread, lower priority of collective pension funds, 
and an incomes policy of wage restraint, without strong redistribution ambitions, were 
other deviations from the Rehn-Meidner model in the 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
6.4 A simultaneous profit and productivity boom – a challenge to the Rehn-Meidner 
growth theory? 
 
From 1992, Swedish economic policy has fulfilled the Rehn-Meidner target of price 




expected inflation; the gap between German and Swedish long-term rates of interest 
was reduced in the second half of the 1990s and even disappeared in 2000. The actual 
rate of inflation between 1992-2004 was on average lower in Sweden than in total 
OECD, EU and also somewhat lower than in small Western European countries (1.6 
and  1.9  percent  per  year  respectively).  At  the  same  time,  the  Phillips  curve  was 
beneficial to Sweden in comparison with total EU and OECD, and also with other 
small  Western  European  countries  and  the  United  States  (see  OECD  Economic 
Outlook June 2005, Table 13 and 18 and OECD Main Economic Indicators August 
2005). 
 
But for the first time in the post-war period, Sweden was no longer an example to 
follow in the case of employment. In 1992-2004 unemployment in Sweden was on 
average higher than in other small Western European countries, if Finland is excepted 
from  this  group,  and  also  than  in  the  United  States.  Swedish  governments  could 
neither prevent the emergence of mass unemployment in the early 1990s, nor bring it 
down to prior levels when the economy recovered. After a steady decline in 1998-
2001, the rate of unemployment began to rise again and is today (December 2005), 
despite an economic recovery, approximately 5-6 percent. Thus, Sweden has departed 
even from the modest Social Democratic goal of 4 percent open unemployment in the 
mid-1990s. Participation rates are also still much lower than at the start of the 1990s. 
Neither has the goal of the government in 1998 to increase the employment share of 
the population aged 20-64 years to 80 percent before 2005 been achieved. (This share 
was 77 percent in 2004.) The question is whether the practice and theory of the Rehn-
Meidner model can explain Sweden’s employment decline and higher unemployment 
in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
The Swedish crisis of the early 1990s confirms the Rehn-Meidner picture of the costs 
of an overheated economy. The absence of a suitably tight economic policy during the 
1980s brought a relatively high rate of inflation and increased relative unit labour 
costs during the 1988-1991 period. Exactly as in the middle of the 1970s, a Swedish 
“cost  crisis”  coincided  with  an  international  recession.  (The  cost  and  profitability 
crisis around 1990 was however more limited than the one in the mid-1970s.) Neither 
were public savings at the end of the 1980s large enough to provide a basis for an 




also reason to focus on the Rehn-Meidner productivity theory when explaining the 
heavy employment losses in Swedish manufacturing during the first half of the 1990s. 
During the lengthy boom of the 1980s enterprises had “hoarded” personnel to meet 
the  high  rate  of  absenteeism,  and  deferred  rationalisations  due  to  high  profits. 
Employment then fell rapidly in the early 1990s as a result of reduced overstaffing 
and comprehensive rationalisations.  
 
Restrictive fiscal and monetary policies in the mid-1990s – alien to the Rehn-Meidner 
remedy  in  a  situation  of  high  unemployment  -  probably  delayed  the  recovery  in 
Sweden  after  the  deep  economic  crisis  at  the  start  of  the  decade.  These  policies, 
together  with  a  modest  international  recession,  led  to  an  increase  in  open 
unemployment in 1996-1997. There is evidence that Sweden maintained a low rate of 
inflation in the 1990s and the early 2000s compared to earlier post-war decades by 
climbing down the Phillips curve. A trade-off between inflation and unemployment 
can  still  be  discerned,  even  if  data  for  the  exceptional  first  half  of  the  1990s  are 
excluded.  But  there  are  also  structural  explanations  for  Sweden’s  higher  rate  of 
unemployment in the 1990s and 2000s. 
 
Some economists have opposed the argument that the functioning of Swedish product 
and labour markets became worse in the 1990s, leading to a higher rate of equilibrium 
unemployment  (see  e.g.  Holmlund,  2003).  They  draw  attention  to  reductions  of 
replacement ratios and marginal taxes, deregulation and the emergence of coordinated 
industrial wage bargaining. Tendencies to an outward shift of the Swedish Beveridge 
curve (and also of the country’s Phillips curve) in the 1990s are probably explained by 
structural changes in the Swedish economy (cf. Holmlund, 2003, pp. 29-32 and 42-5; 
National Institute of Economic Research, 2004, pp. 21-2 and 2005, pp. 15-6; Nutek, 
2005, pp. 45-8). In the 1980s, the reallocation of resources to dynamic sectors within 
manufacturing and to the private service sector, had been retarded in Sweden by a 
weak krona and a high foreign demand for traditional Swedish products. Further, new 
technologies and demand patterns in the 1990s and 2000s might have strengthened the 
tendency  to  greater  occupational  and  regional  imbalances  on  the  Swedish  labour 
market. In total, stronger structural tensions in the 1990s and 2000s could have led to 




labour market. This structural explanation for Sweden’s higher rate of unemployment 
is compatible with the assumption of a stable or even decreasing equilibrium rate of 
unemployment.  It  also  rhymes  better  with  the  Rehn-Meidner  model  than  with  a 
Keynesian model underlining the decisive role of low (domestic) demand. But the 
validity of the Rehn-Meidner model is not always confirmed by Swedish experiences 
since the early 1990s.  
 
Extensive labour market policy programs certainly pressed down open unemployment 
in  Sweden  in  the  1990s.  The  sheer  volume  of  labour  market  policy  and  the 
postponement  of  a  restrictive  fiscal  policy  are  salient  reasons  why  open 
unemployment was kept lower in Sweden than in Finland during the first half of the 
1990s.  However,  labour  market  policy  was  an  insufficient  tool  to  bring  down 
unemployment in a situation of large negative demand shocks. Further, the positive 
employment effects of extensive labour market policy programs were either small or 
non-existent (Forslund and Krueger, 1997; Calmfors, et al., 2001).  
 
These conclusions are not really critical for the Rehn-Meidner model, in which labour 
market policy measures are only complements to aggregate-demand stimulations in a 
deep recession. Besides, findings of serious direct crowding-out effects (deadweight 
and substitution effects) from labour market policy in the first half of the 1990s hit 
youth programs in particular, thus not the supply and adjustment oriented measures 
emphasised  in  the  Rehn-Meidner  model.  In  fact,  no  crowding-out  effects  on 
employment were observed for labour market training. On the other hand, it seems 
that employment subsidies have resulted in strong crowding-out effects (Calmfors et 
al., 2001, pp. 99-192). Neither the Social Democratic targeted subsidy in 1995, nor 
the corresponding non-socialist general subsidy one year earlier seem to have had a 
significant impact on either the level of employment or the rate of inflation (Anxo and 
Dahlin, 1996; Johansson et al., 1999, pp. 111-27). These empirical results are critical 
for the Rehn-Meidner model even with the caveat that the subsidy programs were too 
limited to have any inflation-dampening effects, or designed in a way that inevitably 
led to crowding-out tendencies.  
 
A common opinion in Sweden today, challenging the Rehn-Meidner theory, is that 




and increase employment. When explaining the reduced pace of wage increases at the 
beginning of the 1990s the Social Democrats were of the opinion, as was the LO, that 
the Rehnberg commission had contributed to reducing the pace of wage increases, 
particularly in 1992. A supporter of the Rehn-Meidner model would probably rather 
have  stressed  the  direct  importance  of  lower  demand  for  labour  during  the  deep 
recession of the early 1990s. The sceptical Rehn-Meidner view of incomes policy 
seems  to  be  rejected  by  the  fact  that  the  pace  of  nominal  wage  increases  under 
coordinated industrial agreements from 1998 has, despite high profit margins and low 
priorities  of  income  redistribution,  satisfied  the  goal  of  low  inflation  and, 
approximately, that of global competitiveness in terms of relative unit labour costs 
(National  Institute  for  Economic  Research,  2005,  p.  39).  However,  high  rates  of 
unemployment have put an efficient brake on wage-wage spirals in Sweden, e.g. by 
having weakened the negotiating position of low-income groups. The critical moment 
of  the  new  incomes-policy  regime  will  come  when  Sweden  approaches  the  low 
unemployment rates of the early post-war period. A strong tendency in Sweden to 
local  wage  agreements  between  companies  and  local  trade  unions  or  individual 
employees,  especially  white-collar  workers,  has  added  fuel  to  a  Rehn-Meidner 
scepticism  of  the  possibilities  controlling  general  wage  developments  by  incomes 
policy. This scepticism is supported by the fact that wage drift has constituted almost 
half of total wage increases for white-collar workers in the private business sector 
since the Industrial Agreements were launched in 1998 (National Mediation Office, 
2005). 
 
A related issue is whether the Rehn-Meidner wage theory can explain the widening 
wage gaps in Sweden in the 1990s and 2000s. According to this theory, coordinated 
wage  bargaining,  restrictive  macroeconomic  policies,  low  unemployment  and 
extensive labour market policy programs to enhance labour mobility are all necessary 
conditions for a fair wage structure. A macroeconomic explanation of the larger wage 
inequalities in Sweden is that sizeable depreciations of the krona in the early 1990s 
led to greater profit differentials between plants and industries. Weak groups in labour 
markets may also have had difficulties in defending their relative wage position when 
unemployment rose in the first half of the 1990s. A labour-mobility explanation of 
larger  wage  gaps  focuses  on  the  global  shift  in  labour  demand,  favouring  skilled 




have stimulated the supply of skilled labour, wage gaps increased considerably in 
favour  of  white-collar  workers  in  Sweden  as  in  other  OECD  countries.  A  strong 
company  demand  for  scarce  computer  specialists  and  R&D  personnel  culminated 
during the IT-boom in the late 1990s.  
 
However, these mechanisms behind widening wage gaps in Sweden in the 1990s and 
2000s seem not to have been decisive. Similar macroeconomic and relative-demand 
developments took place in Finland, Sweden’s “twin country” in economics since the 
1980s. But wage inequalities decreased in Finland in the 1990s. When explaining the 
larger wage inequalities in Sweden in the 1990s and 2000s, a Rehn-Meidner theorist 
must  stress  the  limited  scope  and  priorities  of  the  Industrial  Agreements  and  the 
strong tendency to local agreements between companies on the one hand, and local 
trade unions and individual workers on the other.    
 
As in the two preceding decades, the picture of Swedish growth performance, and the 
validity of the Rehn-Meidner growth theory, in the 1990s and 2000s is ambiguous. 
Between 1991-2004, Sweden’s GDP per capita growth was close to the EU-15 on 
average, but lower than that of total OECD and the United States, despite a strong 
Swedish  recovery  since  the  mid-1990s.  (The  recovery  from  the  mid-1990s  was, 
however,  stronger  in  Finland  than  in  Sweden.)  Simultaneously,  Sweden  showed 
higher (labour) productivity growth in the business sector (and manufacturing) than 
all other OECD countries with the exception for Ireland and Korea.
50 Sweden’s poorer 
growth  performance  in  terms  of  GDP  per  capita  than  in  terms  of  productivity  is 
“explained” primarily by the sharp decline in labour force participation rates in the 
country.  Between  1990  and  2004,  no  other  OECD  nation,  with  the  exception  of 
Turkey,  experienced  a  similar  decline  in  participation  rates  (OECD  Employment 
Outlook 2005, Table B). 
 
Since  the  early  1990s  Sweden  has  definitely  lost  her  top  position  in the  “welfare 
league” based on OECD figures on GDP per capita levels (current PPPs). Between 
                                           
50 U.S. Department of Labor (2005, Table 1.1), OECD (2005) and OECD Economic Outlook 2005, 
Table 12. The OECD figures on labour productivity growth in the business sector in the 1990s and 
2000s are particularly favourable for Sweden as output here is related to employment, not to hours 
worked. From 1990 to 2004, hours worked per employed increased in Sweden in contrast to almost all 




1990 and 1992, Sweden fell from sixth to 16
th place, and the country has not yet 
regained the prominent position it held before the crisis of the early 1990s.
51 The 
incomplete Swedish regain of earlier welfare positions is “explained” by the poor 
recovery in labour force participation rates, and also by a deterioration of terms of 
trade. Sweden’s worse terms of trade reflected a strong reduction in the prices of 
teleproducts during the second half of the 1990s, and a depreciation of the krona in 
the early 2000s. 
 
It is outside the framework of this survey to judge whether the Swedish debâcle in the 
“welfare  league”  in  the  early  1990s,  and  the  country’s  partial  recapture  only  of 
ranking positions reflect a delayed system failure or an economic-policy failure as 
expected, for example, from the viewpoint of the Rehn-Meidner model. The Swedish 
economic crisis of the early 1990s could be seen as the result of economic-policy 
mistakes  during  the  overheating  of  the  1980s.  Also,  the  recovery  in  GDP  was 
definitely postponed in the mid-1990s by a restraining fiscal and monetary policy. 
However, the unfavourable development in Swedish participation rates from the mid-
1990s is largely explained by factors beyond the reach of the Rehn-Meidner model. 
 
High labour productivity growth in the Swedish business sector, and particularly in 
manufacturing, in the first half of the 1990s (from 1992) may be viewed as evidence 
supporting the growth theory of the Rehn-Meidner model. The rationalisation stimuli 
were strong during the deep recession, as was the potential for productivity increases, 
due to overstaffing and postponed rationalisations during the boom of the 1980s. A 
radical elimination of inefficient production units contributed to the high productivity 
growth in Swedish industries during the first half of the 1990s. 
 
But  the  continued  high  productivity  growth  in  Swedish  industries  in  1996-2004 
appears  to  contradict  the  growth  theory  of  the  Rehn-Meidner  model.  A  new 
“productivity wonder” in Sweden coincided with a sustainable increase in the profits 
share of GDP, and with a further departure from the wage policy of solidarity. But 
                                           
51 The Swedish fall 1990-1992 was from eigth to 16
th place when GDP per capita levels are expressed 
in constant PPPs (National Accounts of OECD Countries Volume I, 2003, table B5 and B7). In 2003, 
Sweden was in 14
th or 10th position in the GDP per capita league, depending on whether the GDP per 
capita levels are expressed in current or constant PPPs (OECD Main Economic Indicators July 2005; 




high productivity growth in manufacturing, and also in the business sector as a whole, 
mainly reflected a rapid development of, and wide spread use of, innovations in high-
tech industries brought about by strong international competitive pressure. Telecom 
products  represented  by  far  the  largest  part  of  productivity  growth  in  Swedish 
manufacturing during the period 1995-2001 (Confederation of Swedish Enterprise, 
2002, pp. 13-4; Edquist and Henrekson, 2001, p. 415; Lind, 2003, pp. 45-7). In fact, 
the U.S. and Finland experienced a similar “productivity wonder” from the mid-1990 
due  to  high  total  factor  productivity  growth  in  the  IT-sector  including 
telecommunications (Jorgensen and Stiroh, 2000; Saito, 2001). This sector’s share of 
total  production  is  larger  in  the  United  States,  Finland  and  Sweden  than  in  other 
OECD  countries.  Productivity  increases  did  not  gain  momentum  in  other  OECD 
countries from the mid-1990s despite an increase in the profit share of GDP. What 
more is, the reconstruction of the Swedish (and Finnish) business sector during the 
depression of the early 1990s probably laid the foundation for a positive productivity 
development in the long run. Further the deep IT-crisis in Sweden in the early 2000s 
forced  enterprises,  e.g.  the  leading  telecom  company  Ericsson,  to  make  product 
improvements and rationalisations prolonging the period of high Swedish productivity 
growth.  Both  conjectures  are  clearly  in  line  with  the  theory  of  transformation 
pressure, and therefore with the growth theory of the Rehn-Meidner model.
52 
 
To summarize, after the deep economic crisis of the early 1990s, Sweden’s growth 
and stabilisation-policy performance has been encouraging, particularly compared to 
the EU average. The economic success of Sweden is less apparent in the light of the 
U.S.  experience  and  the  country’s  own  employment  and  equity  profile.  Perhaps 
paradoxically for a foreign observer, the “Swedish model” has been able to produce 
price stability, but not to maintain the low rates of unemployment or the small wage 
gaps of the 1970s and 1980s. However in the mid-1990s, Sweden still appeared as a 
country of extensive wage equalisation (OECD Employment Outlook, 1996, Table 
3.1).  
 
                                                                                                                         
 
52 High profits in Swedish manufacturing in general are perhaps one explanation of why the transfer of 
resources  to  knowledge-intensive  industries  seems  to  have  slowed  down  in  the  1996-2002  period 





The economic collapse of Sweden in the early 1990s had certain unique features, but 
it was also expected from a Rehn-Meidnerian analysis of the negative consequences 
of overheating. Higher unemployment in the country in the 1990s and early 2000s, 
compared to earlier decades, was probably a combination of more serious demand 
shocks (especially in the early 1990s), creating large hysteresis effects for the first 
time in the post-war period, more restrictive macroeconomic policies (especially in 
the  mid-1990s)  and  of  stronger  structural  imbalances.  These  explanations  are 
compatible with the combined macroeconomic and structural approach of the Rehn-
Meidner  model,  particularly  with  the  amendment  that  employment  subsidies  and 
supply  or  matching  labour  market  programs  were  not  ambitious  enough,  or 
improperly designed. On the other hand, the apparent success of voluntary incomes 
policy in Sweden, and also the continuing “productivity miracle” of the country in a 
profit-boom situation, is a challenge to the Rehn-Meidner theory. However, high rates 
of unemployment have had a slowing effect on nominal wages, and high productivity 
growth was probably largely unrelated to the profit boom. 
 
 
7. The future of the Rehn-Meidner model  
 
The  Swedish  model  is  often  defined  in  terms  of  the  country’s  general  welfare 
programs,  income-related  social  insurances,  redistributing  taxes,  interventionist 
economic policies and corporatist, consensus-oriented, arrangements in politics and 
labour markets. At most, Sweden has departed here from other countries in degree but 
not in kind in the post-war period, making it extremely difficult to separate a Swedish 
model from a Scandinavian, North European or even a European model. However, 
there is no counterpart outside Sweden to the Rehn-Meidner program of combining 
full employment and equity with price stability and economic growth. This paper has 
analysed the application and performance of the Rehn-Meidner model in Sweden and 
the validity of the model’s underlying economic theory in the light of Sweden’s post-
war  economic  development.  The  latter  analysis  has  contained  an  assessment  of 
Swedish economic policy with the Rehn-Meidner model as norm. 
 
The Rehn-Meidner model legitimised and contributed strongly to the expansion of 




in the 1960s and 1970s. But the model was, despite its all-embracing and conditional 
view of economic and wage policy, never consistently implemented, not even in the 
heydays of the model. As in other OECD countries, decision makers in economic 
policy have gradually switched from a Keynesian to a new-monetarist strategy in the 
post-war period. At the same time, Swedish economic policy has been shaped by the 
third  way  of  the  Rehn-Meidner  model.  Today’s  economic  policy  in  Sweden  is  a 
hybrid,  although  not  fully  consistent,  between  a  Keynesian,  Rehn-Meidnerian  and 
neo-monetarist model, in which countercyclical fiscal policies and voluntary incomes 
policy  is  combined  with  selective  employment  policies  and  with  strict  rules  for 
monetary and fiscal restraints.  
 
The partial application of the Rehn-Meidner model and the importance of more basic 
determinants  warrant  a  warning  against  overstating  the  impact  of  the  model  on 
Sweden’s  macroeconomic  development.  However,  by  pressing  down  open 
unemployment during recessions, active labour market policy has probably avoided 
large  human  sacrifices  and  the  erosion  of  indispensable  human  endowments  in 
Sweden. The wage policy of solidarity could also have had a progressive role in the 
transformation of Swedish industries, particularly by facilitating the phasing out of 
stagnating industries in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
An economic policy more in line with the Rehn-Meidner model might have resulted 
in  fewer  stabilisation  policy  problems  and  higher  economic  growth  in  Sweden, 
particularly in the late 1970s and the 1980s (see also Eklund, 2001). But the Rehn-
Meidner model’s value as a guide for economic-policy making could very well have 
been reduced during the period under review. Institutional and structural-economic 
conditions  for  the  model  have,  undeniably,  changed  radically  since  the  1950s. 
Globalisation  of  financial  markets  and  enterprises  has  indubitably  reduced  the 
effeciency of national economic policy aimed at reducing industrial profit margins. 
Countries following the stabilisation policy recommendations of the Rehn-Meidner 
model run the risk of flight of capital and relocation of production to other countries. 
The possibilities of maintaining solidarity wage policies in a country like Sweden may 
have been reduced through increased labour mobility across frontiers. Coordinated 
wage negotiations at the EU level seem, as of yet, quite distant. Further, the definition 




complicated  by  the  introduction  of  new  technologies  and  work  organisations 
favouring  more  decentralised  and  individualised  wage  negotiations.  Finally,  the 
example  of  Sweden  in  the  1990s  seems  to  confirm  the  view  that  selective 
expansionary measures are inadequate means in a situation of mass unemployment.  
 
But signs of the Rehn-Meidner model having become obsolete are not unambiguous. 
A criticism that globalisation of companies and finance markets has made the model 
out  of  date  must  be  qualified,  as  it  recommends  supply  and  adjustment  oriented 
measures on product and labour markets, together with restrictive general economic 
policies,  to  fight  inflation.  Marginal  employment  subsidies,  for  instance,  could 
persuade  global  enterprises  to  invest  in  a  given  country  in  spite  of  falling  profit 
margins on average. The consumption taxes of the Rehn-Meidner model are not as 
vulnerable  for  global  tax  competition  as  individual  and  corporate  income  taxes. 
International labour mobility is also still too limited to threaten a Swedish wage policy 
of solidarity. Swedish experiences since the mid-1980s show that more decentralised 
and  individualised  wage  bargaining  has  not  excluded  tacit  agreements  among  LO 
unions, or the emergence of new institutions for wage coordination. An argument that 
the Rehn-Meidner model is inapplicable in situations of high unemployment ignores 
that  the  model  does  not  exclude  the  use  of  effective  demand  stimuli  in  a  deep 
recession, although in combination with selective employment policy measures.  
 
It  is  difficult  to  draw  unambiguous  conclusions  regarding  the  status  of  the  Rehn-
Meidner model in an increasingly politically integrated Europe. The EU project has, 
in  several  respects,  brought  a  renaissance  for  the  Rehn-Meidner  ideas.  The 
requirements of the EU Stability and Growth Pact of 1997 for the member countries’ 
public budget to be in balance or even show a surplus over the economic cycle, are in 
conformity with the Rehn-Meidner model. The Commission’s recommendations of 
full  employment,  life-long  learning  and  active  labour  market  policies  to  enhance 
labour mobility and skills within the framework of a sound macroeconomic policy 
bear strong resemblances to the Rehn-Meidner model (European Commission, 2005). 
The  Employment  Guidelines  for  member  countries  regard  Swedish  labour  market 





There are additional signs of a renaissance for the Rehn-Meidner model at EU level. 
EMU  membership  makes  depreciation/devaluations  impossible,  thereby  enhancing 
the pressure for transformation in case of adverse shocks to profit margins in sectors 
exposed to foreign competition. By entering the EMU, fiscal policy and supply and 
adjustment promoting measures on the labour market gain increased importance in the 
economic  policy.  These  arguments  must,  however,  be  modified,  considering  the 
importance  of  explicit  inflation  targets  in  many  OECD  countries  with  floating 
exchange rates. The inflation targets of e.g. the Swedish Central Bank mean that non-
membership of the EMU will not necessarily imply weak incentives to labour market 
reform,  or  provide  room  for  depreciations  securing  the  survival  of  low-efficiency 
enterprises. 
 
Certain aspects of the EU project contradict the Rehn-Meidner model. The original 
Stability and Growth Pact forbids public budget deficits larger than 3 per cent of 
GDP. Countries with a large public sector will have difficulties meeting the budget 
deficit constraint imposed by the Pact, in case of deep recessions. Restrictive fiscal 
policies may even be necessary to counteract tendencies toward large public budget 
deficits,  induced  by  low  economic  activity,  through  automatic  stabilisers.  A  strict 
application of the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact in Sweden would, therefore, 
be incompatible with the high employment ambitions of the Rehn-Meidner model. 
 
Neither  have  EU  incomes  policy  ambitions  since  the  mid-1990s  confirmed  the 
scenario of a European rebirth of the Rehn-Meidner model. The Commission, in its 
so-called White Paper, recommends, not only an active labour market policy, but also 
a “social dialogue” with social partners in order to reduce inflation and strengthen 
European competitiveness through increased profit margins (The EU Commission, 
1993).  The  1999  EU  government  conference  in  Cologne  recommended  a 
“macroeconomic  dialogue”  between  labour  market  stakeholders  and  monetary  and 
fiscal policy actors, in order to fulfil the ambitions of the White Paper. According to 
the Rehn-Meidner model, incomes policy is an unnecessary arrangement in a situation 
of  high  unemployment,  an  inefficient  means  of  achieving  wage  restraint  in  an 
overheated economy, and, possibly, a negative condition for economic growth, if it 





The ambiguous attitude of the EU to the Rehn-Meidner model must not obscure the 
fact  that  the  model,  with  its  unique  combination  of  economic  and  wage  policy 
measures, could indeed animate the discussion of a future European policy for high 
economic growth, low inflation, social justice and full employment. What more is, the 
vision, and partially also the practice, of the Rehn-Meidner model makes a substantial 
contribution to the contemporary discussion of the “third way”, a concept that hitherto 
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Table 1:Swedish labour market policy 1965-2003. Expenditures by the National Labour Market Board 
(AMS) on active labour policy measures of various kinds, less regional policy measures. Expenditures 
on labour market policy by AMS as a share of GDP and by AMS and other public authorities as a share 
of GDP (in brackets). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
Year     Matching       Training       Job creation       Employment subsidies       Programs for disabled     Others       %  of  GDP 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
1965          12.1
1            16.4                 61.6                  -                                                      7.6                           2.3              0.9                  
1966          13.5
1            20.1                 55.3                  -                                                       9.0                        2.1              0.8 
67/68         11.6
1            25.8                 52.4                  -                                                       8.6                        1.6             1.2 
68/69         11.8
1            25.3                 51.0                  -                                                     10.6                        1.3             1.4 
69/70         15.6
1            28.9                 41.1                  -                                                     12.7                        1.7             1.2 
70/71         13.9             30.8                 36.2                  -                                                     17.0                        2.1             1.1 (1.5) 
71/72           9.9             23.8                 52.6                  -                                                     12.5                        1.2             1.8 (2.3) 
72/73           9.5             22.3                 55.5                  -                                                     11.9                        0.8             2.1 (2.8) 
73/74         10.9             25.5                 47.3                  -                                                     15.6                        0.7             1.6 (2.2) 
74/75         13.4             27.0                 35.9                  -                                                     22.7                        1.0             1.2 (1.7) 
75/76         13.3             24.8                 37.8                  -                                                     23.3                        0.8             1.4 (1.9) 
76/77           9.0             27.6                 45.3                  -                                                     17.5                        0.6             2.1 (2.7) 
77/78           8.5             29.1                 46.8                  -  
2                                                  15.1                        0.5             2.6 (3.3) 
78/79           9.4             36.0                 38.0                  -  
2                                                  15.9                        0.7             2.4 (3.1) 
79/80         10.1             37.0                 33.9                  -  
2                                                  18.2                        0.8             2.2 (2.9)    
80/81         11.2             33.9                 32.3                  -  
2                                                  21.8                        0.8             1.8 (2.6) 
81/82         11.2             32.9                 31.5                  -  
2                                                  23.4                        1.0             1.9 (2.7) 
82/83           9.4             29.5                 39.5                  -  
2                                                  21.1                        0.5             2.1 (3.0) 
83/84           9.1             26.6                 44.2                  -  
2                                                  19.9                        0.2             2.2 (3.3) 
84/85           9.7             24.4                 36.8                  8.2                                                  20.7                        0.2            2.1 (3.1) 
85/86         13.3             27.9                 31.3                  4.6                                                  22.8                        0.1            2.0 (2.9) 
87/88         13.5             35.2                 20.0                  2.8                                                  28.3                        0.2            1.7 (2.5) 
88/89         13.7             37.1                 16.5                  2.2                                                  30.4                        0.2            1.6 (2.2) 
89/90         15.5             35.7                 11.8                  1.7                                                  35.1                        0.2            1.4 (2.1) 
__________________________________________ 
90/91
3         12.4            31.4                10.7                   1.2                                                  43.8                        0.5            1.3 (1.6) 
91/92
3           8.5            41.1                12.6                   3.7                                                  33.7                        0.4            2.0 (2.5) 
92/93
3           8.1            35.5                23.0                   5.5                                                  27.9                           -            2.7 (3.1) 
93/94
3           8.4            25.5                32.3                   7.4                                                  26.5                           -            2.6 (3.0) 
94/95
3           9.0            25.8                28.8                   9.0                                                  27.4                           -            2.7 (3.0) 
95/96
3,4        11.0           23.3                22.0                 13.6                                                  30.0                       0.1            2.0 (2.4) 
1997
3           14.4           20.6                24.9                   9.6                                                  30.0                       0.5            1.8 (2.1) 
1998
3           14.3           23.0                25.5                   7.1                                                  30.1                         -              1.8 (2.0) 
1999
3           16.3           26.5                16.9                   9.4                                                  31.0                          -             1.8 (1.8) 
2000
3           21.9           21.2                10.2                 10.2                                                  36.5                          -             1.4 (1.4) 
2001
3           25.3           21.5                  5.0                 12.9                                                  35.4                           -            1.3 (1.4) 
2002
3           15.3           29.5                11.7                 12.3                                                  30.7                        0.5           1.3 (1.6) 
2003
3           18.6          18.6                 13.2                 11.6                                                  37.2                        0.8           1.2 (1.3) 
______________________________________________________ 







Matching activities include labour market information, geographical mobility and investigation costs. 
Training includes labour market education organized by AMS. Job creation measures include youth 
measures such as work experience schemes and practice programs, in-plant training to avoid lay-offs, 
trainee  replacement  schemes,  start-up  grants,  orders  and  other  supports  to  industries,  introduction 
places,  measures  for  partial  unemployment,  specific  job  creation  programs,  stock-piling  subsidies, 
special  job-design  programs  and  relief  work.  Employment  subsidies  include  general,  special  and 
extended recruitment and employment grants (incentives). They do not include relief work and training 
replacement  schemes covered by the  notion  “individual  employment support” used by  AMS since 
1998.  Employment  subsidies  in  the  table  is  identical  to  the  OECD  category  “subsidies  to  regular 
employment in the private sector”. Programs  for disabled persons include special  work-adjustment 
measures, vocational rehabilitation and public sheltered work.  
   
1  The  share  is  underestimated.  Some  expenditure  on  labour  information  and  regional  mobility  are 
counted as labour market training. On the other hand, the inclusion of expenditures on geographical 
mobility in the matching category throughout the table is questionable. Thus, there are arguments for 
summing up the first two columns to show the supply and adjustment oriented policy share of labour 
market policy. 
2 Recruitment subsidies during these years are included in the category job creation or excluded from 
the table by their regional nature.  
3  Estimates  of  the  composition  of  labour  market  policy  for  these  years  are  based  on  OECD 
Employment  Outlook  (see  also  the  labour  market  policy  share  of  GDP  in  brackets).  The  OECD 
statistics cover expenditures on labour market policy programs not only by AMS but also by other 
public authorities.   
















Table 2: Trends  and  fluctuations  in  gross  profits  share  of  gross  value  added  in 
manufacturing, 10 OECD countries 1955-2003 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
                                                    1955-2003                             1955-1972                           1973-2003 
                                                trend  s.d.  trend  s.d.  trend  s.d.              
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Sweden                                    0.04              0.26                -0.68              0.07                0.47              0.15 
                                                (0.26)                                  (-9.30)                                   (3.14) 
 
Norway (1)                              0.12              0.03                0.57               0.36                0.18              0.05 
                                                 (3.70)                                 (1.59)                                    (3.61) 
 
Finland (1)                               0.23              0.08                -0.55              0.29                0.51              0.10 
                                                 (2.23)                                 (-1.90)                                 (4.94) 
 
Denmark                                 -0.11              0.27                -0.57              0.35               0.25              0.06 
                                                (-0.40)                                 (-1.61)                                 (3.95) 
 
Netherlands                            -0.10              0.35                -0.37              0.40               0.05              0.51 
                                               (-0.28)                                 (-0.92)                                  (0.1) 
 
Germany (2)                          -0.30              0.09                -0.54              0.15               -0.11             0.10 
                                               (-3.17)                                 (-3.52)                                 (-1.07) 
 
United Kingdom                     0.03              0.10                -0.37              0.02               0.29              0.09 
                                                (0.25)                                 (-18.21)                                (3.10) 
 
USA                                       0.12              0.03                0.02               0.09               0.13               0.03 
                                               (5.0)                                   (0.19)                                   (5.0) 
 
Canada (3)                             0.13              0.09                -0.15              0.03               0.61               0.17 
                                              (3.74)                                 (-4.45)                                  (3.65) 
 
Japan                                     -0.69              0.09                0.01              0.07               -0.56               0.12 
                                              (-7.58)                                 (0.09)                                  (-4.64) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________________    
Source: Eurostat, OECD National Accounts Vol. II and National Statistics 





Note: The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was used to decide whether the time series of annual 
profit shares are nonstationary. The regression equations included a constant and a trend term. The 
augmented test was based on equations generally including two lagged first differences of the profit 
variables.  Test  statistics  have  been  compared  to  the  MacKinnon  critical  values  for  rejecting  the 
hypothesis of a unit root on the 5 and 10 percent levels. In the cases of a rejection, the first differences 
of the profit variables were regressed on a constant, representing the stochastic time trend. In the cases 
where the ADF-tests were unable to reject the hypothesis of a unit root, the deterministic trends were 
estimated from an equation with the profit share as a dependent variable and a constant and a trend 
term as independent variables. These estimates were based on an ARIMA specification. 
 